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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Bulimia nervosa has received increasing attention over 
recent years, with Fichter (1990) reporting an increase in 
bulimia-related articles since the late 1970's. This disor-
der is diagnosed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders. Third Edition. revised (DSM-III-R; Ameri-
can Psychiatric Association, 1987) by the presence of epi-
sodes of binge eating over which the individual feels little 
sense of control. These binges number over two per week for 
a period of at least three months and are regularly followed 
either by "purgative" behaviors such as self-induced vomit-
ing, or by strict dieting. Bulimia nervosa occurs primarily 
in young women, with the DSM-III-R reporting a prevalence 
rate of 4.5 percent in this population. 
Mizes (1985) reports that physiological abnormalities 
associated with bulimia nervosa include hypokalemia, which 
can lead to weakened skeletal muscles, "cardiac arrhythmias, 
and potentially cardiac arrest" (p. 116). He also reports 
on studies on women with bulimia which find electrolyte 
abnormalities, throat soreness and infection, salivary gland 
enlargement, gastric dilation, bowel irregularities, dehy-
dration, diabetes, amenorrhea and other menstrual irregular-
ities, hypoglycemia, dry skin, and hair breakage. Although 
these are associated primarily with the purge, it is gener-
ally accepted that bulimics rarely purge unless they per-
ceive having binged. 
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In addition, several researchers have suggested that 
depression can result from recurrent binge eating (Fairburn, 
1982, 1983; Hinz & Williamson, 1987; Johnson-Sabine, Wood, & 
Wakeling, 1984). Such a causal sequence is controversial, 
but it is clear that women with bulimia nervosa consistently 
show signs of depression more often than the general popula-
tion (Laessle, Kittl, Fichter, Wittchen, & Pirke, 1987). 
Moreover, as many as 60 percent of bulimics report suicidal 
thoughts and 20 percent have attempted suicide (Viesselman & 
Roig, 1985). Clearly this disorder, characterized by recur-
rent binge eating, has potentially severe consequences. 
This pattern of binge behavior is not exclusive to 
women with bulimia nervosa, however. Researchers have noted 
that many individuals binge without meeting the full crite-
ria for bulimia nervosa (Devlin, Walsh, Spitzer, & Hasin, 
1992). Consequently, the inclusion of a binge eating disor-
der (BED) as a distinct entity was suggested by the commit-
tee responsible for revisions in the eating disorders crite-
ria for the DSM-IV. Individuals with this proposed disorder 
would not meet the full criteria of bulimia nervosa, but 
would instead be diagnosed by episodes of binge eating, with 
an accompanying loss of control and marked distress, at 
least twice a week for six months (Wilson & Walsh, 1991) . 
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Spitzer et al. (1992) attempted to establish the preva-
lence of BED across multiple samples. Estimates range from 
.7% from a community telephone survey to 71.2% from a sample 
drawn from Overeaters Anonymous. Eating disorders are 
secretive behaviors (Martin & Wollitzer, 1988), so community 
surveys, especially those conducted by telephone, are likely 
to underestimate the prevalence of such disorders. In 
contrast, individuals in treatment groups are encouraged to 
be open to admitting problems, while overweight individuals 
tend to binge more frequently than their normal weight 
counterparts (Heatherton, Polivy, & Herman, 1991), suggest-
ing that the Overeaters Anonymous sample overstates the 
prevalence of BED in the general population. The actual 
prevalence of BED likely falls between these two estimates. 
Across all 10 of Spitzer et al.'s samples, the average 
prevalence estimate of BED was 18.1%, with periodic binge 
eating occurring in 27.2% of the participants. This is 
similar to rates reported by Connors and Johnson (1987) who, 
after reviewing the available epidemiological literature, 
suggest that binge eating occurs in between 26% and 61% of 
women, and between 28% and 42% of men. 
Binge eating is not synonymous with bulimia nervosa and 
BED is qualitatively different from bulimia nervosa; bulimia 
nervosa is associated with a level of pathology far beyond 
that of binge eating alone (e.g., Katzman & Wolchik, 1984; 
Ruderman & Grace, 1988; Schmidt & Telch, 1990). However, 
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binge eating is central to both bulimia nervosa and BED, the 
former less prevalent but quite dangerous, the latter appar-
ently less dangerous but quite prevalent. Despite the 
apparent need to understand the common phenomenon of binge 
eating, the mechanisms involved in its development and 
maintenance are still unclear. 
The Restraint Theory Approach 
One potential explanation for the development and 
maintenance of binge eating is called the restraint theory. 
This theory asserts that individuals high in dietary re-
straint, that is, those who consciously restrict their 
eating behavior, may be more prone to binge behavior than 
those low in dietary restraint. These binges reflect disin-
hibition, the loss of dietary control caused by interference 
with restraint. "Dietary disinhibitors may be cognitive, 
emotional, or pharmacological" (Ruderman, 1986, p. 249). 
Support 
The restraint theory is supported by laboratory studies 
on "restrained" and "unrestrained" eaters. Although method-
ology varies, the most prevalent design begins by adminis-
tering a dietary restraint questionnaire either nested among 
several instruments or on a separate "unrelatedn occasion. 
Participants are classified as high or low restrainers based 
upon either a median split or arbitrary cutoffs established 
by previous work utilizing a median split. Volunteers are 
told that they are to take part in a "taste test" in which 
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the effect of tasting one flavor ("preload") upon later 
taste perception is being studied. In the laboratory, 
participants are typically asked either to drink all of a 
milk shake preload or no such preload, then left alone in 
the room with three preweighed bowls of ice cream of differ-
ent flavors. They are then instructed to taste as much of 
each flavor as they need to make accurate ratings (rating 
sheets are provided), and that afterwards they may eat as 
much of the remaining ice cream as they desire because it is 
going to be thrown out anyway. The amount of ice cream 
eaten after a prescribed time (generally between 10 and 20 
minutes) is the dependent measure. 
When using the Restraint Scale (RS; Herman, Polivy, 
Pliner, Threlkeld, & Munic, 1978), typical results show the 
interaction illustrated in Figure 1 (c.f., Ruderman, 1986). 
High scorers.on the RS typically eat more after drinking the 
preload than when in a no-preload condition, a phenomenon 
called "counterregulation" or "disinhibition." Low scorers, 
in contrast, generally eat somewhat less after drinking the 
preload than when in a no-preload condition. These results 
suggest that the use of a preload causes disinhibited eating 
among high scorers. Recent work has found that mere visual 
and olfactory exposure to preloads results in disinhibition 
in restrained eaters but not controls (Jansen & van den 
Hout, 1991; Rogers & Hill, 1989). Although in each case an 
independent physiological mechanism might be posited, a 
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single psychological explanatory system might more parsimo-
niously account for these results. 
Figure 1. Typical interaction of Restraint Scale Scores 
with Preload Manipulation. 
High I 
F E 
0 A 0 
0 T x 
D E 
N 
Low 
No preload 
MANIPULATION 
X = High scorers on the Restraint Scale 
O Low scorers on the Restraint Scale 
x 
0 
Pre load 
Cognitive-based disinhibition is suggested by the 
finding that perceived "forbiddenness," not caloric content 
of a preload (Knight & Boland, 1989} and perceived "filling-
ness" of identical "vitamin" pills (Heatherton, Polivy, & 
Herman, 1989) can cause a disruption in restraint, leading 
to increased eating. Affect-based disinhibition is support-
ed by experiments in which induced anxiety, depression, and 
elation cause increased eating among restrained eaters 
(e.g., Cools, Schotte, & McNally, 1992; Wardle & Beales, 
1988}. Although experimental results are mixed, there is 
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also evidence "that under certain circumstances, alcohol 
knowingly consumed may increase consumption among restrained 
eaters" (Ruderman, 1986, p. 254). 
Finally, bulimia treatment studies provide indirect 
evidence for the restraint theory approach. Psychotherapy 
results in a lowering of restraint, whereas pharma.cotherapy 
either has no effect on or increases dietary restraint, as 
evidenced in unchanged or reduced food intake during drug 
treatment (e.g., Craighead & Agras, 1991; Fairburn et al., 
1991) . The relapse rate of bulimia nervosa after discon-
tinuation of drug treatment is substantially higher than 
that of psychotherapies (Freeman & Munro, 1988) . In failing 
to reduce dietary restraint, pharmacotherapy may place a 
temporary physiological block on binge behavior while leav-
ing restraint, an underlying cause of disordered eating 
intact (Craighead & Agras, 1991). 
Weaknesses 
Despite this support, the data are not as clear as 
might be assumed. There is increasing evidence that several 
variables, such as self-esteem and self-awareness, may 
interact with dietary restraint (Freeman & Prentice-Dunn, 
1990; Polivy, Heatherton, & Herman, 1988). This points to 
a basic problem of heterogeneity of restrained eaters (Coo-
per & Charnock, 1990; Tuschl, 1990; Westenhoefer, 1991). 
Moreover, although researchers utilizing the Restraint 
Scale (RS) have consistently found restraint X preload 
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disinhibitory effects (Ruderman, 1986), those utilizing the 
restraint subscales of the Three Factor Eating Questionnaire 
(TFEQ; Stunkard & Messick, 1985) and the Dutch Eating Behav-
ior Questionnaire (DEBQ; van Strien, Frijters, Bergers, & 
Defores, 1986) have failed to do so (Huon, Wooton, & Brown, 
1991; Lowe & Maycock, 1988; Wardle & Beales, 1987). It 
appears that differing results across scales may be due to 
difficulty in operationalizing "restraint." The RS appears 
to measure chronic unsuccessful dieting, characterized by 
alternating restraint and disinhibition. In contrast, the 
TFEQ and DEBQ tap a more successful restraint pattern (Heat-
herton, Herman, Polivy, King, & McGree, 1988, Lowe, 1993). 
Although Heatherton et al. (1988) consider chronic unsuc-
cessful dieting to be characteristic of the typical dieter, 
Lowe (1993) draws a distinction between current dieting and 
a history of unsuccessful dieting, suggesting that TFEQ 
scores are more related to the former, while RS scores are 
more related to the latter. Thus, an unambiguous definition 
of restraint has yet to be established. 
Finally, although the restraint theory explains the 
disruption of restraint which occurs during binge eating, it 
does not explain why people binge eat. That is, it does not 
explain the motivation behind binge eating or what benefit 
this behavior has for the individual. Consequently, al-
though the restraint theory approach is "exciting and inno-
vative" (Charnock, 1989, p. 343), it requires and is under-
going considerable refinement. 
The Escape Theory Approach 
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In one such refinement, Heatherton and Baumeister 
(1991) report an application of the escape theory which 
explores the motivation behind binge eating. They propose 
that binge eaters do so during a period of "low level cogni-
tion" which is prompted by a desire to escape aversive self-
awareness. To better introduce the concept of low level 
cognition and its relation to escape from the self, I now 
review the basic tenets of action identification theory. 
Action Identification Theory 
Action identification theory, described in detail by Val-
lacher and Wegner (1985, 1987), works off of the assumption 
that people can identify what they are doing. Although 
universal, this identification of personal action may exist 
on many levels. For example, an individual can identify 
what he or she is doing as "moving a paintbrush" or, alter-
natively, "creating a masterpiece" (example from Vallacher & 
Wegner, 1985). The action remains the same, but the identi-
fication of that action is quite different. Moreover, the 
latter identification can be viewed as being at a "higher 
level;" although one can create a masterpiece by moving a 
paintbrush, one can not move a paintbrush by creating a 
masterpiece. In essence, "creating a masterpiece" holds a 
higher place in an identity hierarchy under which "molding 
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clay" or "welding steel" might also fall. Action identifi-
cation theory holds that for any action there are very low 
levels of identification which can be arranged into a number 
of identity hierarchies for which higher-level identifica-
tions provide abstraction, order, and consistency. 
Although levels of identification are relative, low 
level identities are characterized by concrete, immediate 
description, whereas high level identities carry more ab-
stract meaning and temporal significance. Additionally, 
high level identities are typically accomplished "by" low 
level identities. For example, one "shows creativity" l2Y 
"moving a paintbrush." Of the various levels of identifica-
tion available to the individual, it is assumed that only 
one of these can be prepotent. That is, at any given time 
the individual identifies an action on only one level. This 
assumption, made by Vallacher and Wegner (1985), is consis-
tent with a number of other theoretical perspectives, in-
cluding those of G. H. Mead, F. Heider, and G. Kelly (pp 19-
20) • 
According to action identification theory, although 
level of identification is prone to change, under most 
circumstances individuals prefer higher level identities to 
lower level ones. Identities at higher levels provide order 
and stability to our actions, both reflecting the lower 
order identities which they subsume and guiding later ac-
tion. For instance, someone who is "riding a bicycle" may 
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shift consecutively to the higher level identities of "stay-
ing in shape" and "staying healthy." This final identity 
both subsumes the two lower level identities and can guide 
later behavior by suggesting "eating well" as a consistent 
action. 
However, there are limitations to this tendency towards 
high level identification. Actions made in a disruptive 
context, which are particularly difficult, or with which the 
individual has little experience are optimally identified at 
lower levels. When first beginning to drive, for example, 
"applying the brakes" is a more useful identification than 
"going shopping" because the unfamiliar mechanical action of 
braking requires more conscious attention. Moreover, when 
presented with personal failure, individuals tend to use 
lower levels of identification than when they perceive a 
successful personal action (Vallacher, Wegner, & Frederick, 
1987) . This may be due to an avoidance of negative ascrip-
tive identifications and attributions. As noted by Val-
lacher and Wegner (1985}: 
Identities at relatively low level, such as "moving a 
paintbrush," tend to be limited in meaning, and by 
themselves they have little in the way of ascriptive 
significance. Relatively high level identities, howev-
er, are much richer in meaning--meaning which often 
points to the actor as well as the action. The higher 
the level at which an action is identified, then, the 
more the action reflects on the nature of the agent 
producing the action. (p. 188} 
An individual who wishes to escape negative feelings and 
attributions about the self can therefore shift to low level 
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thinking patterns. By using low level identities, he or she 
is able to either avoid making negative self-evaluations or, 
once made, avoid facing these negative self-evaluations. In 
essence, the individual is escaping the self. Baumeister 
(1991) explains: 
Escape from the self is escape from the meaningful 
aspects of the self . . . The mind must be directed to 
stop at the level of sensations and impressions, or 
just to observe events without exploring all the impli-
cations for the self. (p. 18-19) 
It is during these times of escape when the binge is theo-
rized to occur. 
The Escape Theory Causal Seguence 
Although the reader is directed to Heatherton and 
Baumeister (1991) for a more detailed exposition, I briefly 
review the causal sequence proposed by the escape theory of 
binge eating. As illustrated in Figure 2, the escape theory 
asserts that binge eaters are trying to escape aversive 
self-awareness. It begins by noting that binge eaters hold 
themselves against high standards. As self-awareness is 
defined as the comparison of the self against relevant 
standards, aversive self-awareness results from the individ-
ual's inability to meet consistently these high standards. 
Aversive self-awareness by definition entails negative 
affect, including anxiety and depression. To escape this 
aversive self-awareness and the associated negative affect, 
the binge eater attempts to "cognitively narrow" her or his 
thoughts by shifting to low-level thinking patterns. Al-
Figure 2 
Escape Theory of Binge Eating 
Perfectionistic Aversive 
Self-Standards r+ Self-Awareness 
I . 
Inability to Meet I " Negative j 
Self-Standards Affect 
Desire to I Ill 
Escape 
Binge 
Eating 
t? 
Low-level 
Thinking 
I-' 
w 
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though Heatherton and Baumeister {1991) do not specifically 
make this connection, the concepts of low level thinking and 
narrowed cognition are extremely similar to low level iden-
tification as defined by action identification theory. This 
similarity is illustrated by the following quote: 
Low levels of meaning involve narrow, concrete, tempo-
rally limited awareness of movement and sensation in 
the inunediate present. High levels of meaning invoke 
broader time spans and broader implications. High 
levels also involve comparison of events {and the self) 
against broad standards such as norms and expectations. 
High levels of awareness are thus based on mean-
ingful constructs that link inunediate events to distal 
ones, whereas low levels of awareness may be considered 
as deconstructed. . . The deconstruction process may be 
an appealing way to escape from worries, threats, and 
pressures. {Heatherton & Baumeister, 1991, p. 88) 
As discussed earlier in regard to action identification, the 
shift to low level cognition allows temporary relief from 
aversive self-awareness. However, this shift also results 
in a loss of the higher-level cognitive tasks of reasoning 
and inhibition. During these times, dietary restraint 
{inhibition) gives way to binge behavior in those prone to 
binge eating. The binge is therefore theorized to be relat-
ed to a motivated shift to low level thinking patterns 
during which aversive self-awareness is temporarily allevi-
ated. 
Implications for Therapy 
The escape theory represents a significant advancement 
over past conceptualizations of binge eating. Not only does 
it account for the breaking of dietary restraint, but it 
also addresses the motivation behind this break. This is 
important because an understanding of the development and 
maintenance of binge eating allows for more effective pre-
vention and intervention. The theory suggests that such 
intervention should involve a strong cognitive component. 
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A review of two popular alternative treatment approach-
es highlights the contributions of the escape theory. As 
previously noted, pharmacotherapy appears effective in the 
short-term alleviation of binge behavior, but has very high 
relapse rates once the drugs are discontinued. As Craighead 
and Agras (1991) suggest, this may be due to the fact that 
such treatment actually facilitates restraint. Because 
dietary restraint has been linked to binge eating, when the 
pharmacological block on binge behavior is removed the 
patient may actually be more prone to binge eating. Simi-
larly, behavior therapy may initially reduce binge behavior 
but may fail to address the basic personality features 
(e.g., perfectionism, aversive self awareness) which under-
lie the binge (Fairburn et al., 1991). As noted by Hsu 
(1990), "the urges to binge do not always disappear even 
when the patient has begun to eat normally. There is, 
therefore, a need for greater understanding of the cog-
nitions and feelings that occur before and during a 
binge/vomit episode" (p. 60). 
The escape theory contributes to such understanding of 
the cognitive and affective components of binge behavior. 
The theory suggests that behavioral and pharmacological 
interventions focusing exclusively upon the binge are poor 
long-term interventions because they do not address the 
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perfectionism, aversive self-awareness, cognitive narrowing, 
and negative affect which are thought to exist in binge 
eaters. In addition to higher relapse rates, Heatherton and 
Baumeister (1991) suggest that such interventions may lead 
participants to turn to other means of escape, such as 
substance abuse. 
Instead, these etiologically significant personality 
features need to be addressed directly: 
One approach would therefore be to try to alter the 
high standards and perceived expectations that place 
great pressure upon the individual ... A second ap-
proach would focus on the aversive awareness of the 
self that precedes the binge. As long as bulimics have 
low liking, respect, and esteem for themselves, aware-
ness of the self will tend to be aversive ... A third 
approach would be to reshape the individual's cognitive 
responses (see Fairburn & Cooper, 1987). The goal here 
is to break the escalating cycle of negative thoughts 
about the self (and the attendant negative affect) . 
(Heatherton & Baumeister, 1991, p. 102) 
By treating the causes of binge eating directly, the symp-
toms and consequences of binge eating and the often associ-
ated purge behaviors will theoretically be ameliorated 
simultaneously with many personality characteristics which 
might otherwise lead to further self-destructive behaviors. 
Although such cognitive intervention may appear intuitive, 
the continued focus on strict behavioral and pharmacologi-
cal/medical models of binge eating by many researchers and 
practitioners attest to the fact it is not. Consequently, 
continued testing and refinement of the escape theory is a 
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necessary part of emphasizing cognition in effective therapy 
efforts. 
Implications for Research 
The escape theory offers a unique set of expectations 
about individuals who counterregulate in the laboratory (see 
page 6, above, for an illustration of the typical counter-
regulation effect). Although Heatherton and Baumeister do 
not use this term, their theory implies a "binge-prone 
personality," a connected set of personality features which 
are causally linked to binge eating. For example, people 
who counterregulate in the laboratory would be expected to 
hold high standards for themselves. That is, they should be 
perfectionistic. "Although the escape theory of binge 
eating emphasizes the relevant standards of dieting and 
slimness, any high standards could conceivably give rise to 
escapist motivations and binge eating" (Heatherton & Bau-
meister, 1991, p. 90). Consequently, this perfectionism may 
be global, body-specific, or eating-specific. 
According to this theory, however, perfectionistic 
standards are not sufficient to lead to binge eating. 
Rather, aversive self-awareness mediates binge eating in 
perfectionistic individuals. This aversive self-awareness 
requires both a high level of self-focus and a negative view 
of the self. Consequently, binge eaters should be expected 
to be highly self-conscious and have low self-esteem. In 
fact, self-consciousness and self-esteem have each been 
found to interact with dietary restraint in producing dis-
inhibited eating (Freeman & Prentice-Dunn, 1990; Polivy et 
al., 1988). 
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A further hypothesized mediating factor is affect, as 
aversive self-awareness is closely linked to negative af-
fect. Binge eaters are hypothesized to try to avoid both 
negative affect and negative self-awareness through cogni-
tive narrowing. In research, high restraint volunteers may 
become increasingly depressed when forced to eat a laborato-
ry preload (Rogers & Hill, 1989). Consequently, depressive 
symptoms are expected in binge eaters. 
Finally, the escape theory predicts that, during a 
binge, cognitive narrowing occurs. Unfortunately, this 
narrowing has proven difficult to measure. For example, 
Jansen, Merckelbach, Oosterlaan, Tuiten, & van den Hout 
(1988) were unable to discriminate between "binging" and 
"non-binging" individuals' self-talk in the laboratory, 
thereby failing to find evidence of this cognitive narrow-
ing. Moreover, they could find no association between 
dietary restraint and several measures of irrational think-
ing. To date, no one has studied the action identification 
styles of binge eaters. During the binge, the hypothesized 
"cognitive narrowing" should be manifested in low-level 
action identifications, characterized by concrete, immediate 
description. Consequently, binge eaters should be prone to 
lower level identification. No published research to date 
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has directly manipulated level of cognition to determine its 
effect upon eating behavior. 
Although there is considerable indirect evidence for 
the escape theory approach to binge eating (see Heatherton & 
Baumeister, 1991), the approach is largely based upon the 
restraint theory, and is prone to many of the criticisms 
cited earlier. Moreover, laboratory work on restrained 
eating to date has not directly tested the escape theory. 
Research has focused on the interactions of one or two 
constructs (e.g., restraint, self-esteem) with a manipula-
tion (e.g., preload, affect) to cause eating behavior. A 
prohibitively expensive longitudinal higher-order factorial 
design would be necessary to test concurrently all of the 
components of the "binge prone personality." Consequently, 
no direct evidence of a group of binge-prone individuals is 
available. 
On a less global level, Heatherton and Baumeister 
(1991) note: 
A particular ambiguity in the evidence is whether the 
binge eating is a cause, or merely a consequence, of 
the escape from self-awareness. It does seem apparent 
that reductions in self-awareness are important in 
removing inhibitions against eating and thus fostering 
the binge. It may also be, however, that the process 
of eating can absorb the person's attention and there-
fore facilitate the narrowing of attention and resul-
tant escape from self-awareness. (p. 102) 
The causal sequence relating narrowed attention to binge 
eating remains undetermined. 
CHAPTER II 
THESIS OVERVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
This study represented an attempt to evaluate the 
escape theory in two parts: an experiment and a cluster 
study. The experiment sought to determine whether dropping 
chronic unsuccessful dieters' level of cognition would lead 
to laboratory "binge eating." Referring to Figure 2, this 
was an evaluation of the causal nature of the combination of 
diet-related perfectionism and the inability to maintain a 
diet when moderated by a shift in level of cognition. 
Volunteers were grouped into "chronic unsuccessful dieters" 
and "normals" based upon a median split of the Revised 
Restraint Scale (RRS; Heatherton et al., 1988). This natu-
ral grouping variable was crossed with an experimental 
manipulation of level of action identification. Partici-
pants then engaged in an ice cream "taste test," with amount 
eaten as the dependent variable. 
Although Heatherton and Baumeister (1991) are admitted-
ly uncertain about the causal sequence, it was predicted 
that a significant interaction would occur. It was predict-
ed, based upon the tenets of the escape theory, that chronic 
unsuccessful dieters who were asked to think on a low level 
would eat significantly more than their counterparts who 
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were asked to think on a high level. In essence, it was 
predicted that a shift to low level cognition would cause 
chronic unsuccessful dieters to "binge." It was further 
predicted that this effect would be mediated by degree of 
aversive self-awareness/negative affect. 
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In the cluster study, a partial reanalysis was per-
formed on the data from this experiment to determine whether 
the implied binge-prone personality was distinct. That is, 
was there a distinct cluster of people who showed evidence 
of perfectionistic self-standards, aversive self-awareness, 
and negative affect? Further, of the clusters which were 
found, what were the characteristics of those who "binged" 
in the laboratory setting? Measures of various personality 
features were used to cluster participants into natural 
groups. This natural groups variable was then crossed with 
the level of cognition manipulation in the experiment. 
Based upon Kristeller and Rodin's (1989) work, between four 
and six clusters were expected. The escape theory implies 
that one of these should have included individuals who were 
high in global, eating, or body- specific perfectionism, 
high in self-consciousness, low in self-esteem, high in 
depression, and prone to lower-order thinking. Moreover, 
these individuals were expected to counterregulate in the 
laboratory. 
The following is a detailed description of the experi-
ment and cluster study. Because the cluster study was a 
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partial reanalysis of the data obtained during the experi-
ment, the method section is identical and consequently 
combined. The results and discussion sections are differen-
tiated as relevant to either the experiment or cluster 
study. 
CHAPTER III 
METHOD 
Participants 
A total of 158 undergraduate women were drawn from the 
subject pool of Loyola University of Chicago, each receiving 
course credit for her participation. During recruitment, 
these women were explicitly informed that they could not 
participate if they were allergic to dairy products. Al-
though this represents a convenience sample, women in this 
age group appear particularly at risk for developing eating 
disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 1987) . 
As will be described later, a questionnaire near the 
end of the experiment asked participants what they believed 
the hypotheses of the study were. This questionnaire was 
intended to help ensure that the volunteers believed the 
"taste test" cover story. A total of 17 women have been 
excluded from most analyses because they indicated on this 
hypothesis inquiry that they believed that the amount they 
ate was of interest. The remaining 141 participants had a 
mean age of 18.6 years (SD=l.1 years) and tended to be in 
either their first (65 percent) or second (22 percent) year 
of college. Most (67 percent) were Caucasian, 18 percent 
were Asian-American, and 9 percent were African-American. 
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The actual sample sizes for each analysis varied slightly 
due to occasional missing data, and will consequently be 
reported with each analysis. 
Materials 
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The measures employed are summarized in Table 1. Most 
of these measures were utilized solely in cluster study 
analyses, but are described here because they were adminis-
tered during the experiment. With the exception of the 
Behavior Identification Form (BIF), described later, all of 
these instruments have been utilized in smaller factorial 
designs studying dietary restraint. All non-standardized 
instruments are provided in APPENDIX A. Although validity 
and reliability information based upon previous research is 
given with the description of each measure, Table 2 shows 
the internal consistency and intercorrelation coefficients 
for the current sample. 
Personality Measures 
General Perfectionism. General perfectionism, as 
tapped by the Eating Disorders Inventory Perfectionism 
subscale (EDI-P; Garner, Olmstead, & Polivy, 1983), measures 
"excessive personal expectations for superior achievement" 
(p. 18). The EDI-P has shown an internal consistency of .73 
in college students (Garner et al., 1983), and has been 
found to correlate with need for achievement (Coles & Edel-
mann, 1987) and performance in school (Vanderheyden, Fekken, 
& Boland, 1988) . The EDI-P includes six statements which 
Table 1 
Measure Summary. 
Construct 
Escape Theory Components 
Perfectionism Global 
Body-Specific 
Eating-Specific 
Aversive Self-Awareness Self-focus 
Negative 
Self-view 
Negative Affect (Depressive Symptoms) 
Cognitive Narrowing 
Cluster Analysis Validation 
Bulimic Tendencies 
Measures 
EDI-P 
EDI-DT 
RRS, TFEQ-R, 
self-report 
dieting 
SCS-PR 
SES 
BDI 
BIF 
BULIT-R 
25 
26 
Table 2 
Measure Internal Consistencies and Intercorrelations. 
TFEQ- EDI BULIT 
EDI-P SES scs BDI BIF RRS R -DT -R ( 1) ( 2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) ( 8) (9) 
1 .82 
(141) 
2 - . 03 .85 
(139) (139) 
3 .15 -.10 .73 
(138) (136) (138) 
4 .02 - . 63d .18a .88 
(140) (138) (137) (140) 
5 .188 .06 .11 -.04 .81 
(138) (137) (135) (137) ( 138) 
6 .14 - . 25° .15 . 218 .08 .74 
(141) (139) (138) (139) ( 138) (141) 
7 .15 -.16 .14 .06 .00 . 70d . 90 
(139) (137) (136) (138) (136) (139) (139) 
8 . 21 a - . 40d . 20 8 . 22b - . 02 . 64d . 73d .86 
(140) (138) (137) (139) ( 13 7) (140) (138) (140) 
9 .13 - . 43d .17a . 37d .06 . sad . 38d .68d .93 
(137) (136) (134) (136) (135) (137) (138) (136) (137) 
Numbers on the diagonal are Alpha coefficients for each 
scale. Numbers off the diagonal are measure intercor-
relations. 
Two-tailed significance: 812< • 05 t b R<.01, c R<.005, d R<.001 
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are rated on a 1-6 scale anchored by "strongly disagree" and 
"strongly agree." A sample item reads: "Only outstanding 
performance is good enough in my family." 
Drive for thinness. Body-specific perfectionism is 
manifested in an extreme drive for thinness. As measured by 
the Eating Disorders Inventory Drive for Thinness subscale 
(EDI-DT), drive for thinness includes "excessive concern 
with dieting, preoccupation with weight and entrenchment in 
an extreme pursuit of thinness" (Garner et al., 1983, p. 
17). Factor analyses have confirmed the connection of the 
EDI-DT to disordered eating (Laessle, Tuschl, Kotthaus, & 
Pirke, 1989; Vanderheyden et al., 1988), while Vanderheyden 
and Boland (1987) report the EDI-DT to be a significant 
predictor of binge eating over time. Garner et al. (1983) 
report an alpha coefficient of .85 in a college sample. One 
item from this seven-item scale reads "I eat sweets and 
carbohydrates without feeling nervous" (this item is re-
verse-scored). These items are rated on the same 1-6 scale 
as the EDI-P. 
Dietary restraint. 
specific perfectionism. 
Heatherton et al., 1988) 
Restrained eating reflects eating-
The Revised Restraint Scale (RRS; 
"measures the extent to which 
people (a) display (overconcern) with their weight and (b) 
chronically diet to control it" (Heatherton et al., 1988, p. 
26). The RRS is a 10-item scale which includes items such 
as "How often are you dieting? (Circle) Never, Rarely, 
Sometimes, Often, Always" and "What is your maximum weight 
gain within a week? (Circle) 0-1, 1.1-2, 2.1-3, 3.1-5, 
5.1+." 
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Unlike the RRS, which combines both restraint and 
disinhibition into a single composite score (i.e., "chronic 
unsuccessful dieting"), the Three Factor Eating Question-
naire (TFEQ; Stunkard and Messick, 1985) has separate Re-
straint, Disinhibition, and Hunger subscales. However, 
although a factor analysis of the TFEQ confirmed the unifac-
torial nature of the Restraint subscale, this was not so of 
the other two subscales, which blended into two new factors 
bearing little resemblance to the original Disinhibition and 
Hunger subscales (Hyland, Irvine, Thacker, Dann, and Dennis, 
1989). Consequently, only the TFEQ Restraint subscale 
(TFEQ-R) was included in this study as a measure of rela-
tively successful dietary restraint. The TFEQ-R is a 21-
item scale which incorporates some items from the RRS while 
adding a series of true-false items, such as "Life is too 
short to worry about dieting" (this item is reverse-scored). 
Internal consistency estimates range between .78 and 
.82 for the RRS and between .89 and .90 for the TFEQ-R 
(Allison, Kalinsky, & Gorman, 1992; Laessle et al., 1989). 
Laessle et al. also performed a factor analysis with these 
scales and several other eating measures, concluding that 
the RRS and TFEQ-R validly measure related but distinct 
components of dietary restraint. They concluded that the 
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RRS measures weight concerns and an inability to maintain a 
diet (marked by weight fluctuations), while the TFEQ-R 
measures more "the actual restriction of food in everyday 
life" (p. 506). 
The RRS was utilized in the experiment to divide par-
ticipants into two natural groups based upon a median split. 
Women scoring above the median RRS score of 14 were placed 
in the "chronic unsuccessful dieters" group. Women scoring 
at or below this median were labelled "normals." This 
technique has been frequently used in the literature (cf. 
Ruderman, 1986) . Recall that the RRS taps failure to main-
tain a diet as well as weight-related concerns, whereas the 
TFEQ-R does not tap the inability to maintain a diet. 
Because the causal chain outlined by Heatherton and Bau-
meister (1991) emphasizes both perfectionism and an inabili-
ty to achieve this perfectionism, the RRS was chosen over 
the TFEQ-R for this grouping variable. 
Current dieting status. As Lowe (1993) points out, the 
RRS and TFEQ-R are primarily historical measures. That is, 
they measure prevailing past dietary patterns. Although 
past patterns often carry into the present, a high score on 
the RRS or TFEQ-R does not presuppose current dieting. 
Because current dieting status appears important independent 
of history of dietary restraint (Cooper & Bowskill, 1986; 
Lowe, Whitlow, & Bellwoar, 1991), participants were asked to 
rate how strictly they were currently dieting from "not at 
all" (coded 0) to "extremely strictly" (coded 6). 
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Self-consciousness. Self-consciousness represents the 
first component of aversive self-awareness. The Private 
Self-Consciousness Scale (SCS-PR; Fenigstein, Scheier, & 
Buss, 1975) assesses "a cognitive, private mulling over the 
self" (p. 525). Fenigstein et al. report 2-week retest 
reliabilities of .84 for the SCS-PR and review several 
studies attesting to its validity. A sample item from this 
ten-item scale reads: "I reflect about myself a lot." 
Participants rated these items on a 1-4 scale from "extreme-
ly uncharacteristic" to "extremely characteristic." 
Self-esteem. The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (SES, 
Rosenberg, 1965) was included to measure the second compo-
nent of aversive self-awareness. Wylie (1989) reviewed the 
reliability and validity evidence for the SES. She reports 
alpha coefficients between .72 and .92 and a retest reli-
ability of .85 at 2 weeks for this instrument. Factor 
analytic studies have either confirmed the unidimensionality 
of the SES or simply discriminate items worded positively 
from those worded negatively (due to method variance) . This 
two-factor solution is likely to be the result of a response 
set and is not strong evidence against the unidimesionality 
of the measure. Wylie also reviews several multitrait-
multimethod matrices, reporting that self-esteem - self-
concept "correlations exceeded all heterotrait-monomethod 
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and heterotrait-heterotrait correlations in the matrix, 
indicative of discriminatory as well as convergent validity" 
(p. 30). Finally, the SES has been found to correlate with 
depression, anxiety, interpersonal insecurity, loneliness, 
and self-confidence (Wylie, 1989). Participants were asked 
to rate the ten items of this measure on a 1-4 scale from 
"strongly disagree" to "strongly agree." A sample item 
reads: "I feel that I have a number of good qualities." 
Depressive Symptoms. The Beck Depression Inventory 
(BDI; Beck et al., 1979) was utilized to measure negative 
affect. Beck, Steer, and Garbin (1988) review the extensive 
validity evidence for the BDI. Beck et al. (1988) also 
report alpha coefficients for the BDI between .73 and .92 
and stability estimates between .62 (4 months) and .90 (2 
weeks) in nonpsychiatric samples. Each of the 21 BDI items 
includes four statements representing increasing symptom 
severity. Participants were asked to circle all statements 
which were applicable to them in the past week. For exam-
ple, the first item read: "(0) I do not feel sad, (1) I feel 
sad, (2) I am sad all the time and I can't snap out of it, 
(3) I am so sad or unhappy that I can't stand it." For 
exploratory analyses, participants were classified as "non-
depressed" if they scored below ten on this scale, and as 
"depressed" if they scored ten or above. This cutoff has 
been widely used and validated in the literature (c.f., Beck 
et al., 1988). 
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Level of Cognition Tendencies. The Behavior Identifi-
cation Form (BIF; Vallacher and Wegner, 1985, 1989) taps 
individual tendencies to identify actions at high versus low 
levels of identification. Test-takers are asked to choose 
which of two options best describes how they define a series 
of 25 actions, one of which is of a higher level of identi-
fication than the other. For example: 
1. Making a list 
a) Getting organized 
b) Writing things down 
The BIF score reflects a style of action identification, 
binge eaters presumably tending to use low level identities. 
Consequently, the BIF was entered as a clustering variable 
in the cluster study. Vallacher and Wegner (1985, 1989) 
report an alpha of .85 and a 2-week retest reliability of 
.96 among college students. They also present several 
studies attesting to the convergent and discriminant validi-
ty of the BIF. 
Bulimia. The cluster analysis, described later, re-
sulted in several plausible cluster solutions. The Bulimia 
Test-Revised (BULIT-R; Thelen, Farmer, Wonderlich, & Smith, 
1991) was utilized as a criterion measure to determine which 
solution, derived from the other personality measures, was 
most useful. Thelen et al. (1991) report an alpha coeffi-
cient of .97 and 2 month retest correlation of .95. They 
also report several studies attesting to the validity of the 
BULIT-R as screening instrument for bulimia nervosa. Simi-
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larly, Brelsford, Hununel, & Barrios (1992) report alpha 
coefficient estimates of .92 and .93 at two administrations 
and a test-retest reliability of .83 after 4-6 weeks. They 
also found the BULIT-R to be "highly related to the symptom-
specif ic measures of binge eating and purging" included in 
their study (p. 401). The BULIT-R is a 28-item scale in 
which test-takers choose from 5 responses to each item. One 
item reads: "I am presently satisfied with my eating pat-
terns; 1. agree, 2. neutral, 3. disagree a little, 4. dis-
agree, 5. disagree strongly" (this item is reverse-scored). 
Higher scores on this scale indicate increased eating pa-
thology. 
Food Preference. Hunger. Hypothesis Ingui:i::y. Consumption 
Estimate. and Demographics 
Because both the general liking of our experimental 
food and overall hunger were likely to play roles in the 
amount eaten, 6-point food preference scales and a 0-6 
hunger scale were provided. Degree of liking of ice cream 
(hereafter "ICELIKE") was operationalized as the mean pref-
erence rating for vanilla and chocolate ice cream. Also, as 
noted earlier, to screen for individuals who have "caught 
on" to the true dependent measure of the study, each woman 
was asked to guess the purpose of the experiment after the 
"taste test." Additionally, for exploratory purposes, an 
item was included asking participants to estimate how much 
ice cream they ate during the "taste test." Finally, the 
demographic characteristics of current estimated body 
weight, height, age, and year in school were assessed. 
Taste-test Rating Scales 
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Participants were asked as part of the "taste test" to 
rate each flavor on five Likert-type scales. These scales 
are numbered -4 through 4, left to right. One scale reads: 
SWEET 
not at all -4 -3 -2 -1 o 1 2 3 4 extremely 
The other scales are similarly formatted, but ref er to 
"creamy," "flavorful," "rich," and "tasty," as suggested by 
Freeman and Prentice-Dunn (1990) . These scales were uti-
lized to maintain the "taste test" pretense and are not 
included in any analyses presented here. 
Pilot Measures 
After the completion of the experiment, participants 
were asked to complete one of two pilot questionnaires. Of 
little analytic interest here, these questionnaires consist-
ed of a task in which participants were asked either to 
describe the act of eating ice cream in five different ways 
or to rate how accurately 26 listed descriptions of the act 
of eating ice cream described what they did in the experi-
ment. These pilot questionnaires were being tested for a 
separate study related to action identification and are not 
presented in analyses here. 
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Procedure 
The procedure has been outlined in Table 3. Partici-
pants were run individually between 1 pm and 4 pm. This was 
based upon past research methodology and was intended to 
reduce the effects of hunger/satiety. Participants were 
informed that the study concerned how people with different 
personality types have differences in taste perception (See 
APPENDIX B). After obtaining informed consent, the experi-
menter asked the participant to complete the first packet of 
instruments, including the SES, SCS-PR, EDI-P, BIF, BDI, and 
the level of cognition manipulation. 
Table 3 
Procedure Summary. 
Event Ap_proximate Timing 
Introduction 
Informed Consent 
Subject Completes Packet 1 (SES, SCS-PR, BIF, 
EDI-P, BDI, Level of Cognition Manipulation 
Taste-test instructions 
Subject taste test 
Experimenter leaves room, returning in 10 min 
Experimenter returns, places bowls in garbage can 
Subject completes Packet 2 (RRS, TFEQ-R, 
EDI-DT, BULIT-R, Demographics 
Questionnaire, Hypothesis Inquiry, 
:05 
:15 
:26 
Pilot Questionnaire) :40 
Closing Statements :50 
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Level of cognition manipulation 
Participants were randomly assigned to either the high 
level identification condition or the low level identifica-
tion condition. Each woman was asked to think about a 
recent interaction which they had experienced with a person 
of the same sex. Participants in the low-level identifica-
tion condition were then be asked to: 
Try to recall five specific things you did in this 
interaction with this person. Provide as much detail 
as you can; that is, indicate the particular conunents 
you made, questions you asked, or behaviors you per-
formed. 
Participants in the high-level identification condition were 
asked to: 
Try to recall five things about yourself that you feel 
you demonstrated in your interaction with this person. 
Be somewhat general in your answers; that is, indicate 
what opinions and values you conununicated, or perhaps 
what personality traits you demonstrated. 
This procedure replicated that used successfully by Wegner, 
Vallacher, Kiersted, and Dizaldi (1986, p. 30) in an experi-
ment testing one of the tenets of action identification 
theory. 
While each participant generated these descriptions, 
the experimenter retrieved three preweighed bowls of ice 
cream from either a freezer or styrofoam cooler for "tast-
ing." As in the traditional paradigm, participants were 
then left alone for 10 minutes to "rate" the three flavors 
of ice cream (3 1/2 fluid oz. each of vanilla, chocolate 
swirl, and strawberry swirl). In the instructions on rat-
ing, the women were told that "we will be throwing out any 
left-over ice cream, so after you finish all your ratings, 
feel free to go back and help yourself to as much of any 
flavor as you like" (see APPENDIX B). After the 10-minute 
taste test, participants completed a final questionnaire 
packet, consisting of the hypothesis inquiry, RRS, TFEQ-R, 
EDI-DT, BULIT-R, the demographics questionnaire, and the 
pilot measure. 
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Each woman was thanked for her participation and told 
that she would be called at the end of the semester with 
more information about the experiment. Each was provided 
the name and mailing address of the experimenter in the 
event she had questions prior to this time (none contacted 
the experimenter). Once each participant had left, the 
remaining ice cream was retrieved and reweighed. The depen-
dent measure of the study, amount of ice cream eaten, was 
operationalized as the mass of the ice cream remaining after 
the taste-test subtracted from the mass of the ice cream 
before the taste-test. 
At the end of the semester, participants were debriefed 
by telephone and offered a written debriefing outlining the 
true nature of the study (see APPENDIX B) . 
. I 
CHAPTER IV 
EXPERIMENT RESULTS 
Manipulation Check 
Before further analyses, it was necessary to determine 
whether participants responded appropriately to the level of 
cognition manipulation. Recall that each participant was 
asked to list five descriptions of an interaction they had 
recently had with another woman either in general and self-
reflective terms (high-level condition) or specific and 
detailed terms (low-level condition). As a manipulation 
check, the author and an undergraduate research assistant, 
both familiar with the concept of action identification but 
blind to each subject's assignment to condition, rated each 
of the responses given by the participants during this 
manipulation. 
As suggested by Wegner et al. (1986), this procedure 
involved a three-point rating scale. Clearly low-level 
responses were assigned a 1, clearly high-level responses 
were assigned a 3, with a 2 being assigned to responses 
which mixed high-level and low-level elements. In addition 
to this three-point scale, a fourth rating, "not applica-
ble," was added for those cases in which participants either 
failed to include enough responses or provided responses 
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which did not fit the level of action identification rating 
scheme. For example, one participant's fourth and fifth 
responses were rated "not applicable" because only three 
were listed, while another participant failed to describe 
her own actions ("she explained why and told me I could 
return the item"), completely disregarding the manipulation 
instructions. 
Each statement was retyped to allow raters to be com-
pletely blind to the participants' assignment to conditions. 
Responses were placed into five lists, consisting of par-
ticipants' first, second, third, fourth, and fifth respons-
es. Participants' first responses were used as practice 
items and were not included in inter-rater reliability 
analyses. Participants' second responses were then indepen-
dently rated and inter-rater reliability analyses, described 
below, were computed. On those responses where ratings 
disagreed, the raters then discussed their ratings and came 
to a consensual agreement. They then moved on to the par-
ticipants' third responses, independently rating them and 
computing inter-rater reliability. This was, in turn, 
followed by a discussion of discrepant ratings of the third 
responses and establishment of consensual rating agreement. 
Finally, they proceeded in the same manner through the 
fourth and fifth responses. It should be emphasized that, 
although the raters discussed their ratings for each list of 
responses before moving on to the next list (e.g., they 
discussed discrepant ratings on the second response list 
before moving on to the third response list), inter-rater 
reliability analyses for each list were based upon the 
independent ratings for that list. 
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Because this manipulation check was intended only to 
determine whether the manipulation by and large affected 
participants' descriptions of a recent interaction and was 
not intended to be a screening device, the manipulation 
check was considered independent of all other analyses. 
Consequently, all 158 participants were included in the 
manipulation check. They were considered to have completed 
the manipulation if two or fewer of their last four respons-
es received the "not applicable" rating. Three participants 
did not successfully complete the manipulation according to 
this criterion, leaving a sample size of 155 participants 
for remaining analyses. Because the rating system involved 
both categorical (1-3 ratings versus "not applicable") and 
interval (1-3 ratings) level data components, two inter-
rater reliability analyses were conducted. The first analy-
sis, a test of categorical agreement, consisted of a series 
of computations of Kappa coefficients. Kappa coefficients 
for categorical agreement for participants' responses were 
satisfactory: second responses: kappa=.71, third: kappa=.88, 
fourth: kappa=.91, and fifth: kappa=.83. The second analy-
sis used interval-level data, throwing out all responses 
which at least one rater considered "not applicable." In 
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this analysis, Pearson's correlations were computed between 
raters: participants' second responses, ~=.75 <n=l52); third 
responses, ~=.90 <n=l50); fourth responses, ~=.92 <n=l44); 
and fifth responses, ~=.85 <n=l40). 
Because satisfactory inter-rater reliability had been 
established, participants' mean levels of action identifica-
tion could be determined. Recall that any response ratings 
which were under dispute were discussed and a consensual 
agreement was reached by the two raters. Consequently, each 
participants' last four responses had one established con-
sensual rating (first responses, as noted above, were used 
exclusively for ratings practice). A given participant's 
mean level of action identification was defined as the mean 
of these consensually reached ratings for the last four 
responses given by that participant, excluding responses 
which were deemed "not applicable." For example, a partici-
pant whose last four responses were consensually rated 3, 1, 
2, and "not applicable" would have a mean action identifica-
tion level of 2. A one-way ANOVA was then executed with 
participants' mean level of action identification as the 
dependent variable and manipulation group as the independent 
variable. This ANOVA yielded strong evidence that the 
manipulation had an effect {£(1,153)=238.03; ~<.0001). 
Participants in the low-level manipulation group (M=l.26, 
n=??) scored significantly lower than participants in the 
high-level manipulation group (M=2.55, n=78). Consequently, 
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when asked to express themselves at a given level, partici-
pants by and large did so, suggesting that they were re-
sponding to the manipulation of their level of cognition. 
Comparison of Participants Who Mentioned Amount of Ice 
Cream in Their Hypothesis Guesses to Those Who Did Not 
As noted earlier, I decided to exclude participants 
from most analyses if they mentioned in the hypothesis 
inquiry that they believed that the amount eaten was of any 
interest in the experiment. Table 4 shows the results of 
comparing the volunteers who were excluded from further 
analyses to those who were not. To correct for the number 
of comparisons made, a significance cutoff of Q=.003 (.05 
divided by 17) was set for a series of independent samples 
~-tests. Comparison with this conservative significance 
cutoff suggested that observed differences on the BULIT-R 
and self-reported dieting measures may have been due to 
chance factors. This fact, when combined with the observa-
tion that it is conceptually contradictory for someone to 
score high on the current dieting measure and low on the 
BULIT-R, indicated that observed differences on these two 
measures were likely spurious. 
Even with the conservative significance cutoff, women 
who mentioned amount of ice cream in their hypothesis guess-
es were significantly (if slightly) younger and more likely 
to be in their first year of college than those who did not. 
Aside from age and educational level, however, there was 
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Table 4 
Comparison of Participants Included In and Excluded From 
Analyses. 
Variable 
EDI-P 
Dieting Status 
RRS 
TFEQ-R 
EDI-DT 
BULIT-R 
SES 
BDI 
SCS-Pr 
BIF 
Hunger Rating 
ICELIKE 
Weight 
Height 
Age 
Year in school 
Amount eaten 
mean or mode 
and sample sizes 
included excluded 
8.84 
(141) 
2.27 
(139) 
13.86 
( 141) 
10.66 
(139) 
6.29 
(140) 
50.48 
(137) 
33.89 
(139) 
7.76 
(140) 
30.20 
(138) 
17.20 
( 138) 
2.37 
(125) 
4.10 
( 141) 
132.3 
(141) 
65.15 
( 141) 
18.64 
(141) 
1.51 
8.76 
(17) 
1.44 
(16) 
13.59 
(17) 
10.50 
(16) 
8.41 
( 17) 
59.59 
(17) 
32.06 
(17) 
9.94 
(16) 
29.82 
(17) 
17.65 
(17) 
2.47 
(17) 
4.41 
(17) 
Manipulation group 
( 140) 
68.58 
(137) 
high-lvl 8 
129.4 
(17) 
65.65 
(17) 
18.12 
(17) 
1.00 
(17) 
72.47 
(17) 
low-lvl a 
Ethnicity 
(141) 
a 
cauc. 
(125) 
(17) 
a 
cauc. 
(17) 
t-value or 
- a 
chi-square 
- . 07 
-2.03 
- .10 
1.08b 
2.07 
-1.49 
1.27 
- . 31 
.37 
.27 
1.02 
- . 46 
.63 
.38 
p 
value 
* ns 
.044 
ns 
ns 
ns 
.041 
ns 
ns 
ns 
ns 
ns 
ns 
ns 
ns 
.000 
.000 
ns 
ns 
ns 
nominal variables have modal and chi-square values listed; 
b ' * t-test based upon unequal variance computations; ns=p>.10 
44 
little evidence to suggest that the two groups were differ-
ent on the measures included in this study. Nevertheless, 
because of the necessity of maintaining the deception in-
volved in the study, those women who mentioned amount of ice 
cream in their hypothesis guesses were excluded from all 
further analyses. 
Are These Data Suitable for the Planned Analyses? 
I planned to utilize a 2 X 2 X 2 analysis of covariance 
(ANCOVA) with the amount eaten as the dependent measure, the 
manipulation group and the median splits of the RRS and BDI 
as independent measures, and the degree of liking of ice 
cream (hereafter abbreviated "ICELIKE"), hunger ratings, and 
weight as covariates. However, a number of assumptions 
needed to be checked before executing this analysis. 
The first assumption was that the dependent variable 
approximated a normal distribution. Unfortunately, a sta-
tistic used to test the normality of distributions called 
this assumption into question. The Lilliefors test on the 
amount of ice cream eaten (see Norusis, 1990) yielded a 
probability value less than .03, indicating that the hypoth-
esis that the variable was normally distributed should be 
rejected. This result suggested that some normalization of 
the data was required. Consequently, I transformed the data 
such that a variable I will call EATEN equals the square 
root of the amount of ice cream eaten by each subject. The 
Lilliefors test (~>.20) indicated that the distribution of 
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EATEN was approximately normal. Consequently, all further 
analyses calling for the amount of ice cream eaten as a 
dependent measure instead used the normalized variable 
EATEN. However, the mean amounts of ice cream eaten, in 
their original units, will also be reported to aid interpre-
tation. 
I now address assumptions specifically related to the 
use of covariates. First, it was assumed that multiple 
covariates each provided a unique influence on the dependent 
variable. Second, it was assumed that covariates which were 
found to exert a unique influence on the dependent variable 
correlated with the dependent variable to approximately the 
same degree at each level of each independent variable 
(homogeneity of regression) . The first of these assumptions 
was addressed by three regression equations. In each, two 
of the three potential covariates were entered together, 
followed by the independent entry of the third potential 
covariate into an equation predicting EATEN. As can be seen 
in Tables 5-7, ICELIKE was the only variable which contrib-
uted significantly (~=.016) to the prediction of EATEN 
beyond the influence of the other two potential covariates. 
Moreover, as shown in Table 8, neither self-reported hunger 
nor weight contributed significantly once ICELIKE had been 
entered in a stepwise regression predicting EATEN. These 
results strongly suggested that only ICELIKE should be 
retained as a potential covariate. _ 
Consequently, only ICELIKE was checked against the 
assumption of homogeneity of regression. Unfortunately, 
among subjects who were asked to think at a low level, the 
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correlation between ICELIKE and EATEN was .18 (n=67; Q>.10), 
whereas among subjects who were asked to think at a high 
level, the correlation between ICELIKE and EATEN was .38 
(n=69; Q=.001). Using Fisher's z' transformation (see Cohen 
Table 5 
Regression of ICELIKE, Hunger, and Weight on EATEN, Hunger 
Entered Last. 
Step and Multiple 
R2 Chan~e 
Q of 
Variables df R in R change 
(1) ICELIKE 2,117 .260 .068 .068 .017 
& Weight 
(2) Hunger 3,116 .291 .085 .017 .141 
Table 6 
Regression of ICELIKE, Hunger, and Weight on EATEN, Weight 
Entered Last. 
Step and Multiple 
R2 Chan~e 
Q Of 
Variables df R in R change 
(1) ICELIKE 2,117 .282 .080 .080 .008 
& Hunger 
(2) Weight 3,116 .291 .085 .005 .413 
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Table 7 
Regression of ICELIKE. Hunger. and Weight on EATEN, ICELIKE 
Entered Last. 
Step and Multiple Chan~e p of 
Variables df R R2 in R change 
(1) Hunger 2,117 .194 .038 .038 .106 
& Weight 
(2) ICELIKE 3,116 .291 .085 .047 .016 
Table 8 
Stepwise Regression of ICELIKE. Hunger, and Weight on EATEN. 
Step and Multiple p of 
Variable df R R2 
Chan~e 
in R change 
(1) ICELIKE 1,118 .252 .064 .064 .005 
(2) Hunger 2,117 .282 .080 .016 .157 
(3) Weight 3,116 .291 .085 .005 .413 
& Cohen, 1975, pp 50-51), these correlations proved to be 
different at the "trend" level of significance (z=l.26; 
p=.10). Consequently, there was reason to believe that the 
assumption of homogeneity of regression had been violated. 
Although these results suggested that none of the three 
investigated variables were appropriate covariates for 
analyses in which EATEN was the dependent variable and the 
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level of cognition manipulation was an independent variable, 
they did not preclude the use of these measures as indepen-
dent variables. That is, ICELIKE, hunger, and weight could 
have been entered as factorially crossed independent vari-
ables in analyses in which EATEN was the dependent variable. 
However, using median splits of all three in a factorial 
design would have required dividing the number of sample 
sizes per cell by eight. To avoid this division (and the 
resultant loss in statistical power}, I chose to utilize a 
median split of only ICELIKE. As the above analyses show, 
this variable predicted a significant amount of variance in 
EATEN. Consequently, it was potentially quite useful in 
analyses. However, neither hunger nor weight significantly 
. 
added to this prediction, supporting the exclusion of these 
two variables from further analyses. Thus, the proposed 
experimental analysis was changed to a 2 X 2 X 2 Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA} with EATEN as the dependent variable and 
the level of cognition manipulation and median splits of 
ICELIKE and the RRS as independent variables. 
I then tested the assumption of homogeneity of variance 
for this amended design. The variances of EATEN should have 
been approximately the same across all of my 8 proposed 
cells. "The Levene test is a homogeneity-of-variance test 
that is ... particularly useful with analysis of variance" 
(Norusis, 1990, p. 99}. The Levine statistic for this 
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analysis (.3633; .9.f.=1,128; ~=.92) indicated that it was safe 
to make the assumption of homogeneity of variance. 
Analysis of Chronic Unsuccessful Dieting, Liking 
of Ice Cream, and Level of Cognition. 
In review, participants were divided into "chronic 
unsuccessful dieters" and "normals" based upon a median 
split of the RRS, and into "like ice cream" and "dislike ice 
cream" groups based upon a median split of ICELIKE. These 
two subject variables were crossed with one another and the 
level of cognition manipulation (i.e., high-level versus 
low-level identification) in a 2 X 2 X 2 factorial design. 
An ANOVA with EATEN as the dependent variable was executed 
to analyze these data for main and interaction effects. The 
only effect to reach statistical significance was the main 
effect of the median split of ICELIKE (E(l,127) = 10.801; 
n=.001). Not surprisingly, participants who reported liking 
ice cream ate significantly more (M = 80.3 grams) than those 
who reported disliking ice cream (M = 58.5 grams). All 
other main and interaction effects were non-significant (all 
ns>.40). 
This lack of significant results involving the RRS was 
contrary to predictions, and precluded meaningful analysis 
of mediating mechanisms. In short, there was no effect to 
mediate. Consequently, although negative affect was hypoth-
esized to be a mediator in the causal pathway illustrated in 
Figure 2, its role as such could not be tested. However, as 
·, 
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seen in this figure, the escape theory causal model might 
also justify the exploration of negative affect in its own 
right as an influence on eating behavior. It is possible 
that the more distal elements on the causal chain (i.e., 
perfectionistic self-standards and the inability to meet 
these standards), although etiologically important in the 
development of aversive self-awareness, were simply too far 
removed from the hypothesized end result, binge eating, to 
show significant effects. Because aversive self-awareness 
and negative affect are more proximal to binge eating in the 
escape theory causal model, these variables may have shown 
effects moderated by the level of cognition manipulation 
which were not evident in analyses utilizing the RRS. To 
more thoroughly investigate the hypothesized effect of level 
of cognition upon eating, I chose to investigate the main 
and interactive effect of one of these more proximal vari-
ables, negative affect, in exploratory analyses. 
Exploratory Analysis of Negative Affect, Liking 
of Ice Cream, and Level of Cognition. 
In this exploratory analysis, participants were classi-
fied as "non-depressed" if they scored below a ten on the 
BDI or as "depressed" if they scored at or above a ten on 
this measure. The cutoff score of ten is well-established 
(Beck et al., 1988). This natural groups variable was 
crossed with the median split of ICELIKE and the level of 
cognition manipulation in a 2 X 2 X 2 factorial design. The 
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Levene statistic for this design (.7210; gf,=7,127; Q=.65} 
suggested that the variance of EATEN was relatively homoge-
neous across the 8 cells of this design, so a 2 X 2 X 2 
ANOVA was executed. Results are shown in Table 9. 
As can be seen, the main effect of ICELIKE (~(1,127} 
10.8; Q=.001) and the 3-way interaction of ICELIKE, the BDI, 
and the level of cognition manipulation (~(1,127} = 4.6; 
Q=.03} were each statistically significant. The effect due 
to degree of liking of ice cream was identical to that 
described above, but the 3-way interaction was intriguing. 
Consequently, two follow-up ANOVAs were conducted with EATEN 
as the dependent variable. Both ANOVAs crossed the level of 
cognition manipulation with the median split of the BDI as 
independent variables, one ANOVA utilizing only participants 
scoring below the median on ICELIKE (Table 10}, the other 
with participants scoring above the median on ICELIKE (Table 
11} . 
No significant effects were found for participants who 
reported disliking ice cream, while a significant interac-
tion effect between the BDI and level of cognition was found 
for participants who scored high on ICELIKE. Simple effects 
analyses revealed that depressed women who reported enjoying 
ice cream ate significantly more when asked to think on a 
high level than when asked to think on a low level (~(1,127} 
= 6.47, Q<.025}. In contrast, non-depressed women who re-
ported liking ice cream ate slightly (but not significantly) 
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less when asked to think on a high level than when asked to 
think on a low level (E(l,127)=.36, p>.10). Table 12 shows 
the mean amount of ice cream eaten (in raw score units) and 
sample sizes for each cell involved in the three-way ICELIKE 
X BDI X manipulation interaction. Figure 3 displays the 
interaction. 
Table 9 
BDI X ICELIKE X Manipulation ANOVA with EATEN as the Depen-
dent Variable. 
Sum of Mean 
Source Squares df Square E p 
I CELI KE 57.207 1 57.207 10.801 • 00]. 
BDI 2.177 1 2.177 .411 ns 
Manipulation 2.621 1 2.621 .495 ns 
ICELIKE X BDI .793 1 .793 .150 ns 
ICELIKE X Manip. 1.158 1 1.158 .219 ns 
BDI X Manip. 10.224 1 10.224 1.930 ns 
3-way Interact. 24.338 1 24.338 4.595 .034 
Error 672.670 127 5.297 
* ns means p>.10 
Table 10 
BDI X Manipulation Follow-up ANOVA for Participants who 
Dislike Ice Cream with EATEN as the Dependent Variable. 
Sum of Mean 
Source Squares df Square E 
BDI 3.836 1 3.836 .724 
Manipulation .684 1 .684 .129 
BDI X Manip. .297 1 .297 .056 
Error (from 672.670 127 5.297 
omnibus 
analysis) 
* ns means p>.10 
Table 11 
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p 
* ns 
ns 
ns 
BDI X Manipulation Follow-up ANOVA for Participants who Like 
Ice Cream with EATEN as the Dependent Variable. 
Sum of Mean 
Source Squares df Square E p 
BDI .003 1 .003 .001 ns 
Manipulation 1.941 1 1.941 .366 ns 
BDI X Manip. 34.264 1 34.264 6.469 <.02 
Error (from 672.670 127 5.297 
omnibus 
analysis) 
* ns means p>.10 
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Table 12 
Mean Amounts Eaten Cin raw score units) and ns per cell in 
the ICELIKE X Level of Cognition Manipulation X BDI design. 
Low Scorers High Scorers 
on ICELIKE on ICELIKE 
BDI BDI 
c Low High Low High 
0 
G L Low 52.47 64.07 Low 83.92 59.78 
NE (19) (14) (24) ( 9) 
I V 
T E 
I L Hi 57.80 62.92 Hi 77.22 116.00 
v (25) (13) (27) ( 5) 
E 
Figure 3 
BDI X Manipulation X Liking of Ice Cream 
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CHAPTER V 
EXPERIMENT DISCUSSION 
Certain limitations of these results should be kept in 
mind during interpretation. First, although every attempt 
has been made to ensure that the underlying assumptions of 
the various statistical techniques utilized were met, one 
key assumption required to generalize beyond the present 
sample may have been compromised: sample size. Due to the 
unanticipated entry of ICELIKE as a factorially crossed 
independent variable in analyses, the number of participants 
in certain cells was low, in one case dropping to five. 
Although it appears clear that including this variable in 
analyses was crucial to understanding the data, doing so may 
have reduced the generalizability of results. Second, the 
analysis which included the BDI, although intriguing, was 
admittedly exploratory. Third, in the case of the differ-
ence in magnitude of ICELIKE-EATEN correlations across 
levels of the action identification manipulation, the effect 
reached only the "trend" level of significance. In all 
three cases, although effects will be discussed at face 
value in the ensuing discussion, the reader should keep in 
mind that these results require replication. 
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The Effect of Level of Cognition Upon the Relative Influence 
of Internal and Situational Factors in Determining Behavior 
Before discussing the factorial analysis, I would like 
to briefly address the serendipitous finding that ICELIKE 
correlated more strongly with EATEN for those women who were 
asked to think at a high level than for those who were asked 
to think at a low level. Vallacher and Wegner (1987) noted 
that individuals who are thinking at a high level tend to 
post hoc attribute their actions more to internal causes and 
less to situational causes than do individuals who are 
thinking at a low level. 
The current results add to this observation. Women in 
the current study made ice cream preference ratings before 
eating the ice cream. Consequently, the fact that this 
internal factor was more influential in determining the 
amount of ice cream eaten among participants who were asked 
to think on a high level than among those asked to think at 
a low level suggests that its relative influence cannot be 
the result of post hoc attribution. Rather, it appears that 
the internal factor of ice cream preference was, in fact, 
more influential in determining the amount eaten in condi-
tions of high-level thought than low-level thought. This 
suggests that not only do people's post hoc attributional 
reports vary in this way, but the actual relative influence 
of personal versus situational factors in determining behav-
ior can vary depending upon their level of thinking. When 
people are thinking on a high level, they tend to act more 
according to internal influences, such as hunger and food 
preference, than when they are thinking at a low level. 
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This may be important in future research, as there is 
increasing evidence that individuals who are recurrent 
unsuccessful dieters are highly influenced by external 
eating cues (e.g., Heatherton et al., 1989; Ogden & Wardle, 
1990). Lowe (1993) even suggests that the more chronic the 
pattern of unsuccessful dieting, the more susceptible an 
individual becomes to external cues to overeat. This would 
help explain why individuals scoring high on the RRS show 
the classic "disinhibitory" effects of a milk shake preload. 
Because they are more sensitive to external (over) eating 
cues, when chronic unsuccessful dieters are signalled that 
the experimenter wants them to eat a large volume of high 
calorie foods (e.g., via a preload), they do just that! As 
Lowe (1993) put it: "The critical 'disinhibitory' aspect of 
the various preload manipulations used in eating regulation 
studies may be the inf orrnation such preloads convey about 
the kind of eating behavior deemed appropriate in such 
studies" (p. 109). Future research might look into whether 
manipulating level of cognition, which appears to have an 
effect on the relative amount of influence of internal cues 
in determining behavior, affects chronic unsuccessful diet-
ers tendencies towards "disinhibitory" eating after a pre-
load. Based upon Lowe's (1993) hypothesis, chronic unsuc-
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cessful dieters who are presented with a preload and asked 
to think on a high level (increased internal focus) should 
eat less than chronic unsuccessful dieters who are asked to 
think on a low level (increased external focus). 
Factorial Analyses Discussion 
Returning to the current study, the results failed to 
support the hypothesis that lowering chronic unsuccessful 
dieters' level of cognition causes binge eating. In fact, 
prevailing dietary pattern, as measured by the RRS, was of 
little main or interactive significance in determining the 
amount of ice cream eaten in this study. At least three 
explanations could account for this finding. First, the 
manipulation might have been ineffective in leading partici-
pants to think at a high or low level. However, results of 
the manipulation check, the just discussed effect of the 
manipulation upon correlational findings, as well as the 
finding that the manipulation interacted with degree of 
liking of ice cream and the BDI all argue against this 
conclusion. Second, the experimental "taste test" design 
may have been flawed. However, this design closely mirrors 
those used in the dietary restraint literature utilizing the 
RRS with significant results. Third, the hypotheses may 
have simply been incorrect. That is, change in level of 
cognition may not account for the disinhibition found in 
these restraint theory studies. 
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Returning to Lowe's {1993) recent contribution, it is 
clear in hindsight why manipulating level of cognition may 
not have affected women with a history of unsuccessful 
dieting {i.e., a high score on the RRS) any more than those 
without such history. The current study did not systemati-
cally vary cues to participants of how much ice cream they 
were expected to consume. Consequently, whether they were 
heavily influenced by external cues to overeat, as Lowe 
suggests high scorers on the RRS are, was irrelevant. No 
systematic external overeating cues were provided! Although 
one might argue that the "demand characteristics" of the 
environment provided an external eating cue, a distinction 
should be made between a cue to eat and a cue to overeat. 
In the present study, participants were requested to merely 
taste the ice cream. This contrasts with the preload stud-
ies in which certain subjects were requested to fully con-
sume a high calorie drink. The request to take a small 
taste of a food {eating cue) is quite different from the 
request to fully consume it {overeating cue) . In the pres-
ent study, no strong cue to overeat was presented, and 
chronic unsuccessful dieters ate about as much as other 
participants. 
Instead, the results indicate that, of participants who 
reported enjoying eating ice cream, those high in depressive 
symptoms ate significantly more when asked to think on a 
high level than when asked to think on a low level, whereas 
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those low in depressive symptoms ate somewhat (but not 
significantly) less when asked to think at a high level than 
when asked to think at a low level. 
Interestingly, participants who reported disliking ice 
cream showed no effect due to our manipulation, their degree 
of depressive symptomatology, or the interaction of the two. 
Although this stands to reason, research to date has not 
taken into account ideographic food preferences, potentially 
leading to misleading results. For example, past null 
findings may have been due to the use of food which a sub-
stantial number of participants disliked. In fact, research 
in this area has relied heavily upon ice cream as an experi-
mental food without a measure of how much each participant 
cares for this food. Minimally, future research should 
include such a measure. In addition, it may be fruitful to 
allow participants to choose from a number of experimental 
foods, then to run separate analyses for each of these 
foods. Because effects occurred only when participants 
reported liking ice cream, I focus on this group in further 
discussion. 
As noted earlier, high-level cognition tends to be much 
more self-referential than low-level cognition (Baumeister, 
1991) . The manipulation check indicated that those whom we 
asked to think at a given level by and large did so, sug-
gesting the conditions were characterized by either highly 
self-referential (high-level) or less self-referential (low-
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level) thought. Participants who were high in depressive 
symptoms and asked to think at a high level may not have 
enjoyed the resultant increase in self-awareness, leading 
them to eat significantly more than their counterparts who 
were asked to think at a low level. Placed in light of the 
escape theory, the former participants may have sought to 
escape aversive self-awareness by eating. However, the 
hypothesis that this eating provided escape by lowering 
level of cognition is questionable; women who were low in 
depressive symptoms and already thinking at a low level ate 
about as much as their symptomatic high-level counterparts. 
It remains to be explored why these women, already thinking 
at a low level and with no theorized desire to escape, would 
eat as much as women who are theorized to desire escape from 
aversive self-awareness. 
Consequently, these results provide only partial sup-
port for the escape theory of binge eating. It appears that 
an increase in aversive self-awareness may be related to 
increased eating, but the present study found no evidence 
that this is a mediating mechanism in a causal chain linking 
chronic unsuccessful dieting to binge eating. Moreover, the 
present data call into question Heatherton and Baurneister's 
(1991) contention that "reductions in self-awareness are 
important in removing inhibitions against eating and there-
fore fostering the binge" (p. 102, emphasis added). In 
fact, it would appear that quite the opposite was true for 
63 
women who were high in depressive symptoms; inhibitions were 
removed by an increase in self-awareness. 
This result may, however, relate to findings that 
intense affect can disrupt restraint (e.g., Cools et al., 
1992; Wardle & Beales, 1988). In fact, Vallacher and Wegner 
(1987) review a number of studies in which strong emotions 
such as evaluation apprehension can lead to performance 
impairment. It may be that strong negative itself affect 
disrupts dietary restraint. Arnow, Kenardy, and Agras 
(1992) described two antecedents to binge eating among the 
obese: strong negative affect and perceived abstinence 
violations. In their sample of binge eaters, strong nega-
tive affect was most closely associated with binge eating 
among those who were not actively restricting their diets. 
Their conclusion: "negative mood may on its own precipitate 
a binge, even in the absence of a restrictive eating pat-
tern" (p. 164). The present results appear to bear out this 
conclusion in a student sample. 
Left unanswered is how the link between negative affect 
and eating in the general population might lead to chronic 
disordered eating. As noted earlier, occasional binge 
eating is not equivalent to an eating disorder. Eating 
disorders such as bulimia nervosa are associated with a much 
greater level of psychopathology than binge eating alone 
(e.g., Katzman & Wolchik, 1984; Ruderman & Grace, 1988; 
Schmidt & Telch, 1990). Moreover, the purgative behavior of 
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bulimics is uncharacteristic, even in mild degree, of the 
typical dieter (Lowe, 1993). Consequently, it should be 
recognized that the occasional binge eating of many individ-
uals in response to negative affect may not represent the 
low end of a continuum with severe eating pathology at the 
high end. Instead, affective lability (Greenberg & Harvey, 
1987), personality disorder (e.g., Johnson & Wonderlich, 
1992), a "body image disorder" (Rosen, 1992), or some other 
factor may be necessary to send the individual into a down-
ward spiral into an eating disorder. At this point, whether 
eating patterns should be viewed in qualitative or quantita-
tive terms remains hotly debated (c.f., Ruderman & Besbeas, 
1992) . 
Even so, Lowe (1993) reviews a number of lines of 
evidence suggestive of behavioral conditioning in the binge 
eating of chronic unsuccessful dieters. Although physiolog-
ically it should be expected that emotional distress would 
lead to a reduction in appetite (Heatherton, Polivy, & 
Herman, 1991), chronic unsuccessful dieters may have had 
successive pairings of negative affect and binge eating. 
The current study suggests that women who are high in de-
pressive symptoms respond to heightened self-awareness by 
eating. When this eating represents a violation of a per-
sonal diet, the individual may strive to achieve a more 
restrictive diet, while at the same time experience an 
increase in depressive symptoms due to their perception of 
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dietary failure. This increase in negative affect may, in 
turn, make them more susceptible to overeating, completing 
the downward spiraling pattern described by Heatherton and 
Polivy (1992). If this pairing of negative affect to eating 
continues, this spiral could provide a powerful source of 
conditioning. "The frequent past pairings of negative 
affect and overeating in chronic dieters may transform from 
an unconditioned stimulus for reduced eating into a condi-
tioned stimulus for increased eating" (Lowe, 1993, p. 110). 
Although intriguing, this potential connection between 
eating in response to negative affect among normal women and 
the negative affect eating observed among eating disordered 
women is highly speculative, requiring further research. 
Moreover, although this explanation is consistent with the 
results presented here, it fails to account for why people 
tend to eat in response to negative affect. Further re-
search will be necessary to determine whether binge eating 
lowers level of cognition and consequently reduces aversive 
self-awareness, is simply the result of a disruption of 
restraint in the presence of food deprivation, has a direct 
physiological effect, or produces some other effect. The 
current results make clear the need to look at self-aware-
ness and depression in such research. 
CHAPTER VI 
CLUSTER STUDY RESULTS 
Data analysis for the cluster study fell into several 
steps: 1) data transformation, in which data were factor 
analyzed, resulting in three orthogonal factor scores for 
each subject; 2) cluster analysis, in which twelve potential 
cluster solutions were generated; 3) evaluation and choice 
of cluster solutions, in which two of these twelve were 
selected for further analyses; 4) factorial analysis, in 
which the interactive and main effects of the cluster solu-
tions upon eating behavior were explored; and S) cluster 
comparison, in which the clusters from the most promising 
cluster solution were compared on a number of measures. 
Step 1 -- Data Transformation 
Before executing the cluster analysis, it was necessary 
to consider which scales would be included. Because a 
number of the scales utilized in this study were highly 
correlated, it seemed inappropriate to enter them untrans-
formed into the cluster analysis. This is because correla-
tions between measures represents a sharing of variance, 
such that, insofar as two measures are correlated, there 
will be, to some degree, a redundancy in variance. For 
example, in Figure 4, A, ~' Q, and ~ represent the variance 
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Figure 4 
Diagram of Hypothetical Measure Variance 
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B 
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accounted for by four different measures. As one can see, 
the variance represented by areas ab, ac, and be is measured 
twice, while the variance represented by the area area abc 
is accounted for three times. In contrast, the variance 
represented by g is measured only once. If we were to enter 
variables A, ~. ~. and ~ untransformed into a cluster analy-
sis, the outcome would be the result of a differential 
weighing of variance such that abc would be counted three 
times, ab, ac, and be would be counted twice, but g would be 
counted only once. Unwittingly, we would have allowed 
certain bits of variance to be more important than others 
based entirely upon the correlation between measures rather 
than a priori decisions. 
Applying this to the current study, if I were to enter 
a number of highly correlated variables such as the RRS, 
TFEQ-R, BULIT-R, and EDI-DT into a cluster analysis with the 
BDI (which shows much weaker correlations with other mea-
sures in the study) , the shared variance in the four dietary 
measures would be weighed more heavily than that of depres-
sion due to measure-intercorrelation alone. Given the 
results of the experimental analyses, it would be dangerous 
to assume that dietary patterns should be of primary imper-
tance in determining the cluster solution. Consequently, an 
orthogonal factor analysis was executed to eliminate the 
problem of redundant variance. 
Factor analysis or principal component analysis is 
of ten used when the researcher knows most of the vari-
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ables used in the study are highly correlated. The 
uncritical use of highly correlated variables to com-
pute a measure of similarity is essentially an implicit 
weighing of these variables. (Aldenderfer & Blash-
field, 1984, p. 21) 
Using the outcome of factor analyzing the current data 
prevented an implicit weighing of any variables. 
A factor analysis of dieting status, SES, EDI-P, EDI-
DT, BDI, RRS, TFEQ-R, and the BIF with a Varirna.x (orthogo-
nal) rotation was performed to transform these data. Three 
factors were extracted based upon an examination of scree 
and the cutoff eigenvalues of one. The rotated factor 
loadings, eigenvalues, and percent of variance accounted for 
are presented in Table 13. The first factor showed high 
loadings from the RRS, TFEQ-R, EDI-DT, and self-report 
dieting status, suggesting that this factor represents the 
individual's degree of dieting behavior and dietary res-
traint. The second factor showed high loadings of the BDI 
and (in a negative direction) the SES, and, to a lesser 
degree, the SCS-PR, suggesting that this factor represents 
negative affect and aversive self-awareness. Finally, the 
third factor was comprised most strongly by the BIF, EDI-P 
and SCS-PR. This final factor appears to involve degree of 
perfectionistic self-focus. 
Scores for each of the three factors were computed for 
each subject using the regression estimation method, an 
"exact procedure" of computing factor scores (Gorsuch, 
1974) . The exact procedures contrast with "approximation 
Table 13 
Factor Loadings. Eigenvalues. and Percent of Variance Ac-
counted For. 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
RRS .83695 .13357 .10282 
TFEQ-R .91793 .01649 .06871 
EDI-DT .82104 .27361 .12192 
Dieting status .85766 .07531 -.07434 
SES -.22333 -.84822 .03178 
BDI .07678 .88724 .00269 
SCS-PR .06306 .31179 .54741 
BIF -.11136 -.06353 .74988 
EDI-P .21980 -.14737 .67818 
Eigenvalue 3.38556 1.48139 1.29316 
% of Variance 37.6 16.5 14.4 
Note: Variables loading above .30 are underlined to aid 
interpretation 
procedures" of computing factor scores (e.g., "the unity 
method") in that the former take all of the variance of a 
given sample (including "error variance") into account in 
computing scores, whereas the latter restrict the computa-
tions to certain variables thought to be particularly sa-
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lient to each factor (c.f., Gursuch, 1973). Although factor 
scores derived though approximation techniques appear to be 
more reliable upon replication than those derived through 
exact procedures (Gorsuch, 1973, p. 245), this is an issue 
of inference, rather than description. Instead, in descrip-
tive analyses, emphasis is placed upon representing the true 
common factor scores for a given sample. Using slightly 
different terminology, Rummel (1970) notes that: 
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The common factor score regression estimates make use 
of all of the information contained in the standardized 
data and the factor loadings. They are therefore 
better estimates of the true common factor scores [of 
descriptive statistics] than the composite and basic 
variable estimates [two approximation procedures]. (p. 
438) 
It was concluded that, although an approximation procedure 
appears to be the logical method of computing factor scores 
for inferential statistics, an exact method, such as the 
regression technique, appears more suitable for descriptive 
work. Because cluster analysis is a descriptive, not an 
inferential, technique, the latter route was taken, and 
factor scores were computed for each participant through the 
regression estimation procedure. These factor scores were 
then entered as a matrix into the cluster analysis. 
Step 2 -- Cluster Analysis 
Although step 1 was relatively straightforward, step 2, 
cluster analysis, was more complicated: 
The use of cluster analysis in practice does not in-
volve simply the application of one particular tech-
nique to the data being studied, but instead involves a 
series of steps each of which may be dependent upon the 
results of the preceding one. It is generally impossi-
ble a priori to anticipate what combinations of vari-
ables, similarity measures and clustering techniques 
are likely to lead to interesting and informative 
classifications. (Everitt, 1980, p. 103) 
Consequently, seven hierarchical agglomerative clustering 
methods were employed at this preliminary step. All seven 
methods involved a stepwise progression, in the first step 
of which all of the points (one per participant) were laid 
out as individual "clusters." These points were then pro-
gressively combined to form larger clusters which were 
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themselves combined until, after a number of steps, all of 
the points were combined into a single heterogenous cluster. 
In my analyses, clusters were put together based upon the 
squared Euclidian distance formula: 
D. 2 istance = (factorla-factorlb) 2 + (factor2a-factor2b) 2 + 
2 (factor3a-factor3b) , 
in which "factorla" is the factor 1 score for one cluster, 
"factorlb" is the factor 1 score for a comparison cluster, 
and so on. 
The exact use of this distance formula in combining 
clusters varied with the clustering method employed. Al-
though each method will be sketched out here, the reader is 
referred to Aldenderfer and Blashfield (1984), Everitt 
(1980), and Norusis (1990) for more thorough expositions of 
cluster analytic techniques. In the single linkage method, 
clusters were joined based upon the distance between their 
two closest points. At the first step, this simply meant 
joining the two closest points. At later steps, this in-
volved computing the distance between clusters based upon 
their closest points. Clusters whose closest points were 
the least distant from one another were successively com-
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bined. The process was similar in the complete linkage 
method, except that cluster distances were determined by the 
distance between their two farthest (rather than closest) 
points. 
In the average linkage between groups method, rather 
than looking at one point in each cluster to compute dis-
tance, every point in a cluster was compared to each point 
in the comparison cluster. Distance was then computed as 
the average distance across these between-cluster pairs. 
The average linkage within groups method combined clusters 
to minimize the distance between pairs of cases within 
(rather than between) clusters. 
In contrast to these methods, the centroid method did 
not involve pairing off of individual points. Rather, a 
mean score on each of the three factors was computed across 
cases within each cluster. The distance between clusters 
was then computed based upon a comparison of the cluster 
means. In a similar fashion, the median method compared 
clusters based upon their median (rather than mean) within-
cluster values. 
Finally, in Ward's method, a hybrid of the centroid and 
average linkage within groups methods, the mean score on 
each variable was computed across cases within each cluster. 
Then, still within each cluster, the distance between each 
case and the cluster mean was computed. Clusters were then 
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combined such as to minimize the distances between each case 
and its corresponding cluster mean. 
Because all seven of these techniques combined clusters 
stepwise until all cases were placed in a single cluster, it 
was necessary to "cut off" the process at a useful point. 
Although this cut-off point is somewhat arbitrary in cluster 
analysis, Aldenderfer and Blashfield (1984) suggest an 
examination of fusion coefficients at each step. The fusion 
coefficient represents the distance between the pair of 
clusters which were combined at a given step. A large 
"jump" in a list of fusion coefficients indicates that two 
clusters may have been joined inappropriately, signaling 
that the clustering process should be cut off at the previ-
ous step. For example, in Table 14, the fusion coefficients 
were increasing slowly and steadily until step 126, when a 
"jump" occurred. This indicated that, for the median method 
with these data, the appropriate cluster solution was the 4-
cluster solution found at step 125. 
Not all of the cut-off points were as clear as in the 
median technique, however. Several cut-off points appeared 
reasonable for the average linkage within groups and Ward's 
methods. Consequently, several solutions were generated for 
each of these methods. In all, 12 solutions appeared plau-
sible: 2-, 3-, and 4-cluster solutions from the ~verage 
linkage within groups method, a 2-cluster solution from the 
average linkage between groups method, a 3-cluster solution 
Table 14 
Portion of the Agglomeration Schedule for the Median Tech-
nigue. 
Step 
121 
122 
123 
124 
125 
126 
127 
128 
Clusters in Solution 
8 
7 
6 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1 
Fusion Coefficient 
3.405674 
3.700638 
4.046055 
4.611880 
4.932259 
8.760168 
10.608168 
13.779575 
from the single linkage method, a 3-cluster solution from 
the complete linkage method, a 2-cluster solution from the 
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centroid method, a 4-cluster solution from the median meth-
od, and 2-, 3-, 4-, and 5-cluster solutions from Ward's 
method. These 12 solutions were then compared in the next 
step of analyses. 
Step 3 -- Cluster solution validation against the BULIT-R 
These 12 solutions were subjected to validation against 
BULIT-R scores. This involved a series of one-way ANOVAs 
with the BULIT-R as the dependent measure and each cluster 
solution as an independent measure. Table 15 shows the 
results of these analyses. Effect sizes (eta squared) are 
not reported because, in cluster comparison, this statistic 
is misleading. Recall that, in the first step of each 
heirarchical cluster analytic technique, each participant 
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Table 15 
Cluster Validation Against the BULIT-R (series of ANOVAs) . 
Cluster BULIT-R Means 
Technique 1 2 3 4 5 .r: 
Single Linkage 50 41 87 2.501 .086 
Complete Linkage 52 45 61 7.305 .001 
Average/Between 50 87 4.719 .032 
Average/Within 61 45 33.739 .000 
Average/Within 58 45 74 22.375 .000 
Average/Within 58 44 74 48 15.359 .000 
Centroid 50 87 4.719 .032 
Median 47 72 49 38 14.611 .000 
Ward's 47 68 34.983 .000 
Ward's 47 46 68 17.417 .000 
Ward's 42 46 68 57 17.757 .000 
Ward's 42 53 68 57 42 15.338 .000 
represents a different "cluster." If all of these "clus-
ters" are entered into an ANOVA with any dependent variable, 
the effect size is 1.00. All of the variance in scores on 
the dependent variable across paricipants is accounted for 
by the "cluster solution" because each cluster corresponds 
to one and only one participant. Moreover, as the number of 
clusters in the "solution" declines with the combination of 
clusters, the effect sizes on the dependent measure natural-
ly diminishes until it approximates zero. Consequently, it 
is inappropriate to compare clustering techniques on the 
basis of their relative effect sizes. Instead, some consid-
eration of degrees of freedom needs to be made. The _r: 
statistic, representing the ratio of effect size to degrees 
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of freedom, allows for such consideration. Consequently, 
only E statistics are reported and were used to compare the 
cluster solutions obtained in Step 2. 
Although a number of solutions yielded significant 
differences in mean BULIT-R scores between groups, the 2-
cluster solution from Ward's method and the 2-cluster solu-
tion from the average linkage within groups method yielded 
clearly higher E values than the other 10 solutions. Conse-
quently, only these two cluster solutions were kept for 
further analyses. 
Step 4 -- Factorial Analysis 
The factorial analysis can be viewed as further valida-
tion of the cluster solutions chosen in step 3. Essential-
ly, this analysis detected variability in eating behavior 
across clusters due to the level of cognition manipulation 
and degree of liking of ice cream. Two 3-way (clusters X 
manipulation X median split of ICELIKE) ANOVAs were executed 
with EATEN as the dependent variable, one ANOVA each for the 
2-cluster Ward's and 2-cluster average linkage within groups 
solutions. Results are shown in Tables 16 and 17. 
It was predicted that significant interactions would 
occur, such that only certain clusters would show disin-
hibited eating due to the manipulation. Although neither 
ANOVA showed such a significant interaction, Ward's 2-clus-
ter solution did interact with the manipulation and ICELIKE 
in a manner approaching statistical significance (p=.056). 
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Table 16 
Ward's 2-Cluster Solution X ICELIKE x Manipulation ANOVA. 
Sum of Mean 
Source Squares df Square E .Q 
Manipulation 3.286 * 1 3.286 .617 ns 
Ward's Clustering 2.750 1 2.750 .516 ns 
ICELIKE 66.016 1 66.016 12.394 .001 
Man. X Clusters 4.947 1 4.947 .929 ns 
Man. X ICELIKE .300 1 .300 .056 ns 
Clusters x ICELIKE 2.645 1 2.645 .497 ns 
3-way interaction 19.844 1 19.844 3.726 .056 
Error 623.189 117 5.326 
* ns means .Q>.10 
Table 17 
Average Linkage Within Groups 2-Cluster Solution X ICELIKE X 
Manipulation ANOVA. 
Sum of Mean 
Source Squares df Square E .Q 
Manipulation 3.374 1 3.374 * .613 ns 
Avg/Within Clusters 8.013 1 8.013 1.456 ns 
ICELIKE 68.289 1 68.289 12.406 .001 
Ma.nip. x Clusters .019 1 .019 .003 ns 
Ma.nip. x ICELIKE .031 1 .031 .006 ns 
Clusters X ICELIKE .315 1 .315 .057 ns 
3-way interaction .784 1 .784 .142 ns 
Error 644.005 117 5.504 
* ns means .Q>.10 
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Consequently, although these results are admittedly explor-
atory, I performed two follow-up analyses on this interac-
tion, one including only participants who scored below the 
median on ICELIKE, the other including only those who scored 
above the median on this measure. Two ANOVAs were conducted 
with EATEN as the dependent variable and ward's 2-cluster 
solution and the level of cognition manipulation as indepen-
dent variables (see Tables 18 and 19). Similar to the 
experimental results, a 2-way interaction effect was found 
only among those women who reported liking ice cream. 
Simple effects analyses revealed that this interaction was 
such that Ward's cluster 2 participants who reported liking 
ice cream ate significantly more when asked to think at a 
high level than when asked to think at a low level (E=4.79, 
R<.05). There was no effect due to the manipulation among 
Ward's cluster 1 participants who liked ice cream (E=.03, 
R>.10). Table 20 shows the mean amount of ice cream eaten 
(in raw score units) and sample sizes for each cell involved 
in the three-way cluster-manipulation-ICELIKE interaqtion. 
Figure 5 illustrates this interaction. 
Step 5 -- Cluster Comparison 
Given the interaction effect found in step 4 and the 
main effect found on the BULIT-R, it was important to exam-
ine the characteristics of both of the clusters found 
through Ward's method. That is, what were the personality 
factors which differed between these clusters which might 
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Table 18 
Ward's 2-Cluster Solution X Manipulation for Participants 
Who Reported Disliking Ice Cream. 
Sum of Mean 
Source Squares df Square .E 11 
Manipulation 1.093 1 1. 093 • .21 ns 
Ward's Clusters 4.720 1 4.720 .89 ns 
2-way Interaction 1.922 1 1.922 .36 ns 
Error (from 623.189 117 5.326 
omnibus ANOVA} 
• 
ns means 11>.10 
Table 19 
Ward's 2-Cluster Solution X Manipulation ANOVA for Partici-
pants Who Reported Liking Ice Cream. 
Sum of Mean 
Source Squares df Square .E 11 
• Manipulation 2.782 1 2.782 .52 ns 
Ward's Clusters .000 1 .000 .00 ns 
2-way Interaction 22.869 1 22.869 4.29 <.05 
Error (from 623.189 117 5.326 
omnibus ANOVA} 
• 
ns means 11>.10 
Table 20 
Means and ns per cell in ICELIKE x manipulation X Cluster 
design. 
Low Scorers High Scorers 
on ICELIKE on ICELIKE 
Cluster Cluster 
c 1 2 1 2 
0 
G L Low 50.41 70.38 Low 81.52 58.40 
N E (22) ( 8) (27) (5) 
I V 
T E 
I L Hi 56.79 63.20 Hi 80.32 108.80 
v (29) (5) (25) (5) 
E 
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Figure 5 
Cluster X Manipulation X ICELIKE 
Participants who 
dislike ice cream 
Cluster 1 
p>.10 
Cluster 2 
p>.10 
Participants who 
like ice cream 
Cluster 1 
p>.10 
Cluster 2 
p<.05 
.. Low-level cognition ~High-level cognition 
co 
N 
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have contributed to these effects? To explore this question 
I first converted participants' self-reported dieting status 
and SES, EDI-P, EDI-DT, BDI, RRS, TFEQ-R, BIF, and BULIT-R 
scores into standard (z) score units. These converted 
scores were thenentered as dependent variables in a MANOVA 
with Ward's 2-cluster solution as the independent variable. 
Because the multivariate effect was significant (E=23.47, 
R<.001), a series of univariate analyses were conducted. 
Mean cluster z-scores and results of the univariate tests 
for each measure are shown in Table 21. 
Table 21 
Mean z-scores and Univariate Statistics for each Measure and 
Cluster. 
cluster univariate 
Variable 1 2 eta 2 E 
Dieting Status - .09 .41 .04 5.05 .026 
* EDI-P - .01 - .02 .00 .00 ns 
SES .34 -1.54 .52 135.85 .000 
SCS-PR - .08 .45 .04 5.76 .018 
BDI - .34 1.50 .52 138.37 .000 
BIF .02 .14 .00 .26 ns 
RRS - .10 .53 .06 7.65 .007 
TFEQ-R - .03 .38 .03 3.27 .073 
EDI-DT - .16 .85 .14 21.38 .000 
BULIT-R - .22 1.02 .22 34.98 .000 
All univariate tests have 1,127 degrees of freedom except 
for the BULIT-R which, due to missing data, has 1,125 de-
grees of freedom. Cluster 1 has 106 participants and clus-
ter 2 has 23 participants on all measures except for the 
BULIT-R, for which cluster 1 has 104 participants due to 
* missing data. ns means R>.10 
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Because the cluster analytic method maximizes differ-
ences between the clusters and this cluster solution was 
validated against the BULIT-R, it was not surprising to find 
significant effects for most of these variables. Still, it 
is striking the degree to which women in the second cluster 
were more depressed and had lower self-esteem than those in 
the first cluster. In addition, women in cluster 2 clearly 
appeared to be more prone to dysfunctional eating patterns 
as measured by the BULIT-R, EDI-DT, and the RRS. Finally, 
these women showed a relatively high degree of self-con-
sciousness and a tendency to be dieting more strictly. 
Interestingly, no differences were found between the clus-
ters in degree of general perfectionism or cognitive level 
tendencies. 
CHAPTER VII 
CLUSTER STUDY DISCUSSION 
Factor Analytic Data Reduction 
Before discussing results based upon the cluster solu-
tions, the preliminary factor analysis warrants mention. As 
noted above, the first factor reflects degree of dieting, as 
measured by simple self-report, the RRS, TFEQ-R, and EDI-DT. 
Interestingly, whereas the EDI-DT, TFEQ-R, and self-report 
dieting are measures of desire for and action towards suc-
cessful dietary inhibition, the RRS measures both dietary 
inhibition and disinhibition. Despite efforts at psychomet-
rically removing disinhibition from measures of dietary 
restraint (as was attempted in the TFEQ-R), it appears that, 
in an unselected population, dietary inhibition and disinhi-
bition are closely related. This statistically confirms 
Heatherton et al.'s (1988) observation that "the restrained 
eater who is exclusively restrained ... is not representa-
tive of restrained eaters in general, whereas the restrained 
eater who occasionally splurges is ... Most dieters (to 
their regret) display both restraint and disinhibition" (p. 
20) • 
Moreover, this calls Lowe's (1993) distinction between 
current dieting and a history of unsuccessful dieting into 
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question. Although Lowe considers these two factors dis-
tinct, it appears rare to find, at least in the college 
student population, a current dieter without a history of 
unsuccessful dieting or a woman with a history of unsuccess-
ful dieting who is not still trying to diet. Rather, it 
appears that, for most young women, the more they diet, the 
more they break their diets (and vice versa) . 
The second factor, related to negative affect and 
aversive self-awareness, replicated the generally accepted 
negative association between depression and self-esteem. 
Interestingly, private self-consciousness also loaded, 
albeit at a relatively low level, on this factor. There is 
some evidence that not only is this relationship between 
negative affect and self-focused attention reliable, but 
that the induction of negative affect can cause an increase 
in self-consciousness (Wood, Saltzberg, & Goldsamt, 1990). 
However, it is uncertain whether and under what conditions 
increases in self-consciousness can lead to increases in 
negative affect. 
Self-consciousness loaded more strongly on the third 
factor, which appears to tap perfectionistic self-focus. 
These data bear out the previously mentioned theoretical 
observation that high-level thinking is related to self-
consciousness and attention to personal standards (e.g., 
Baumeister, 1991). It appears that individuals who tend to 
think at a high level tend also to think about themselves 
and their personal goals. 
Cluster Analysis Discussion 
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These factors, when entered into cluster analysis, 
yielded a number of potential cluster solutions. However, 
based upon the validation of these solutions against the 
BULIT-R, two appeared to be the best discriminators of 
degree of bulimic symptomatology. Of these two, only the 2-
cluster solution from Ward's method showed an interactive 
effect with the level of cognition manipulation. As in the 
experimental analyses, this interactive effect held true 
only for women scoring above the median on degree of liking 
of ice cream. That is, when participants reported disliking 
ice cream, there were no main or interactive effects involv-
ing the manipulation or the two clusters. However, among 
those participants who reported liking ice cream, those in 
cluster 2 ate nearly twice as much ice cream when asked to 
think on a high level as when asked to think on a low level 
(see Figure 4). Cluster 1 women showed no such significant 
difference. These results, in concert with the finding that 
cluster 2 participants scored significantly higher than 
cluster 1 participants on the BULIT-R, strongly suggest that 
these individuals are prone to binge eating. Moreover, this 
binge eating may be triggered by an increase in self-focus 
(inherent in higher-level thinking) in the presence of a 
food which they enjoy. Given these findings, it is impor-
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tant to explore the characteristics differentiating this 
"binge-prone" group (cluster 2) from the "normals• of clus-
ter 1. 
The binge-prone group was strikingly more depressed and 
lower in self-esteem than the normals. In this sense, the 
3-way interaction between the cluster solution, degree of 
liking of ice cream, and the level of cognition manipulation 
on amount of ice cream eaten replicates the results of the 
experimental analyses. Beyond this, the cluster analysis 
demonstrated that such a group was naturally distinguish-
able. That is, the binge-prone group "naturally" emerged 
through statistical techniques without resorting to the 
arbitrary and exploratory median split technique utilized 
earlier. Moreover, the cluster results suggest that there 
was more to the binge-prone group than depressed mood and 
low self-esteem. After all, only 18 percent of the women 
were in the binge-prone group, whereas by definition roughly 
half scored above the median on the BDI. 
Turning to other measures, it appears that a strong 
drive for thinness was associated with binge-prone individu-
als. This appears to represent the paradox identified by 
dietary restraint researchers: it is precisely those women 
who strive for the thin ideal who are most likely to prevent 
their attainment of this ideal by binge eating (e.g., Heat-
herton & Baumeister, 1991). The significant difference on 
the self-report dieting scale and the RRS suggest that 
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binge-prone women may attempt to attain the thin ideal by 
dieting, both currently and in the past (Heatherton & Pol-
ivy, 1992). Although not naturally more likely to think on 
a different level than others, when induced to think at a 
high level, these already somewhat self-conscious women 
turned to a food which they enjoyed, thereby breaking their 
diets. 
Aside from the effect of the manipulation, it is impos-
sible with these data to do more than guess at the potential 
causal sequences among the personality characteristics of 
the binge-prone group. However, the escape theory may be 
applied here with some modifications. To begin, unlike 
Heatherton and Baumeister's (1991) assertion, I failed to 
find evidence that perfectionism on a global level predis-
poses one to binge eating. Rather, it appears that these 
women are perf ectionistic primarily as it relates to body 
image. Although such emphasis on women's external appear-
ance is unfortunately normative in popular society (e.g., 
Hooker & Convisser, 1983), the current study suggests that 
binge-prone women take a more extreme stance than most. 
This likely leads them to diet more of ten and more strictly 
than most women, among whom dieting is accepted practice 
(e.g., Rosen & Gross, 1987). 
Poor self-esteem and depression may play a part in 
taking the sociocultural pressures on body shape and dieting 
to an extreme. These women may turn to dieting in the 
90 
belief that their lives will be dramatically improved if 
only they had a better body (e.g., Rosen, 1992). The recur-
ring inevitable failure in which these chronic dieters break 
their diets or fail to maintain body changes may exacerbate 
their poor self-esteem and depression (e.g., Heatherton & 
Polivy, 1992). However, the question then remains: Why do 
they break their diets? The current results suggest that 
level of cognition is involved. In particular, it appears 
that binge-prone individuals, at least when in the presence 
of an enjoyable food, will overeat when asked to think on a 
high level. As noted earlier, this may be due to the in-
crease in aversive self-awareness which is likely to result 
from high-level, self-reflective thinking among depressed 
individuals. 
However, it is uncertain exactly what function such 
eating serves. Although the current study has helped to 
elucidate the characteristics most prevalent in binge-prone 
women and the triggers of binge eating in these individuals, 
the reasons why these women turn to food need to be investi-
gated more fully in future research. In addition, the 
limitations outlined in the experiment discussion above (p. 
57), including small cell sizes, are largely applicable 
here. These findings were descriptive and exploratory, in 
need of replication and refinement. Moreover, the external 
validity of the cluster study was limited by the represen-
tativeness of the sample. Cluster analysis is essentially a 
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descriptive technique, and as such the cluster solutions may 
have been affected by the unique characteristics of the 
current sample. However, because the only other study to 
date to use cluster analysis to analyze eating style "types" 
neither used standardized instruments nor validated the 
cluster solution against a behavioral measure (Kristeller & 
Rodin, 1989), the current cluster study represents a sub-
stantial step towards understanding the nature of disordered 
eating. 
CHAPTER VIII 
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The long-term risks to participants due to the experi-
ment appear minimal because a) exposure to similar foods is 
likely to be an integral part of most college students' 
lives, and b) even in restrained eaters, research has shown 
that disinhibiting effects do not carry over outside of the 
laboratory (Wardle & Beales, 1987). Additionally, the 
informed consent form which each participant signed provided 
all procedural information which might have affected their 
willingness to participate, and made clear that participants 
could have withdrawn from the study without penalty at any 
time. 
Of some ethical concern was the use of deception re-
garding the dependent measure (amount of ice cream eaten) of 
the study. However, this deception was justified by the 
potential reactivity of participants to this knowledge. 
Participants who were aware of the dependent measure were 
not likely to yield usable results (and were consequently 
excluded from analyses if they so indicated) . The delay in 
debriefing was justified by the high profile which the study 
had. Word of "the ice cream study" spread rapidly through-
out the subject pool. Knowledge of the deception would 
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likely have spread just as rapidly if I had not delayed 
debriefing, leading to useless results. Moreover, this 
delay did not put the volunteers at risk. Unlike some 
deceptions {e.g., sham intelligence test results) with 
potential long term negative consequences {e.g., dropping 
out of school), it is inconceivable how having people be-
lieve that their taste ratings were of primary interest 
would have led to any negative consequences. 
93 
In the debriefing {See APPENDIX B), these issues were 
made clear to each woman as the true nature of the study was 
revealed. Additionally, the name and mailing address of the 
experimenter was provided to participants immediately fol-
lowing the experiment in the event of long-term negative 
effects or further questions before the end of the semester. 
None contacted the experimenter before the end of the semes-
ter. Finally, as noted to the participants, all data analy-
ses and results have been reported in such a way that their 
identities are kept in strict confidence. Consequently, it 
appears that this study was in accordance with all APA-
mandated ethical guidelines. 
APPENDIX A 
NON-STANDARDIZED INSTRUMENTS 
Self-Report Dieting. Food Preference Ratings. and Hunger 
Instructions: Please read each of the following questions 
and place an "X" at the appropriate point along the scale. 
How strictly are you currently dieting? 
not at all 0---1---2---3---4---5---6 extremely strictly 
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How much do you enjoy each of the following foods? 
extremely 
not at all enjoy 
Vanilla Yogurt 0---1---2---3---4---5---6 
Chocolate Ice Cream 0---1---2---3---4---5---6 
Chocolate Pudding 0---1---2---3---4---5---6 
Fruit Yogurt 0---1---2---3---4---5---6 
Vanilla Pudding 0---1---2---3---4---5---6 
Vanilla Ice Cream o---1---2---3---4---5---6 
How hungry are you currently? 
not at all hungry 0--1--2--3--4--5--6 extremely hungry 
Demographic Inf orrnation 
What is your ethnic background? (circle) 
african-american caucasian asian-american other: 
~~~~~ 
What year in college are you? (circle) 
Fresh Soph Jr Sr Other 
What is your current weight in pounds? 
What is your age? 
What is your approximate height? 
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Level of Cognition Manipulation* 
Instructions: Think about an interaction you have had with 
a person of the same sex within the last week or so. This 
interaction could be a chat at school, a discussion of some 
kind, a conversation at a party or at work, and so forth. 
Any interaction at all is fine. 
[Low-level manipulation] 
Try to recall five specific things you did in this 
interaction with this person. Provide as much detail as you 
can; that is, indicate the particular comments you made, 
questions you asked, or behaviors you performed. 
[High-level manipulation] 
Try to recall five things about yourself that you feel you 
demonstrated in your interaction with this person. Be 
somewhat general in your answers; that is, indicate what 
opinions and values you communicated, or perhaps what 
personality traits you demonstrated. 
* This manipulation is a slight adaptation of that used by 
Wegner et al. (1986). 
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Taste Test Ratings 
Please taste the FIRST flavor and rate it below. 
SWEET 
not at all -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 extremely 
CREAMY 
not at all -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 extremely 
FLAVORFUL 
not at all -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 extremely 
RICH 
not at all -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 extremely 
GOOD-TASTING 
not at all -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 extremely 
Please taste the SECOND flavor and rate it below. 
SWEET 
not at all -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 extremely 
CREAMY 
not at all -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 extremely 
FLAVORFUL 
not at all -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 extremely 
RICH 
not at all -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 extremely 
GOOD-TASTING 
not at all -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 extremely 
Please taste the THIRD flavor and rate it below. 
SWEET 
not at all -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 extremely 
CREAMY 
not at all -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 extremely 
FLAVORFUL 
not at all -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 extremely 
RICH 
not at all -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 extremely 
GOOD-TASTING 
not at all -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 extremely 
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Food Consumption Estimate 
In your estimation, how much of the ice cream did you eat in 
this experiment? 
none of it +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+ all of it 
Hypothesis Inguiry 
What is your best guess at what this study was designed to 
assess? Please guess even if you are not sure. 
Experimenter Script 
[USHER SUBJECT INTO ROOM] 
APPENDIX B 
SCRIPTS 
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Thank you for coming. It has been suggested that people 
with different personality types may perceive the taste of 
food differently. In this experiment, we are trying to 
determine whether this is true. To do this, we will be 
asking you to fill out several questionnaires, then to take 
part in an experimental taste test of ice cream. First, 
however, I need you to sign this informed consent form. 
[HAND SUBJECT INFORMED CONSENT FORM] 
Do you have any questions? 
[ANSWER QUESTIONS, WAIT FOR SIGNATURE, THEN TAKE INFORMED 
CONSENT FORM. GIVE QUESTIONNAIRE PACKET lA or lB, DEPENDING 
ON WHICH IS GIVEN TO YOU (THESE ARE IN RANDOM ORDER)] 
Thank you. First, please complete these questionnaires as 
honestly as possible. Remember, all your responses will be 
kept strictly confidential. Let me know when you are 
finished. 
[WAIT FOR SUBJECT TO COMPLETE QUESTIONNAIRE PACKET. WHEN 
SHE HAS COMPLETED IT, IMMEDIATELY RETRIEVE ICE CREAM AND 
RATING SHEET. RECORD THE SUBJECT # (AS SHOWN ON THE ICE 
CREAM) ON THE QUESTIONNAIRE PACKET AND RATINGS SHEET. DROP 
THE QUESTIONNAIRE PACKET IN THE nDROP BOXn] 
Thank you. 
[HAND THE SUBJECT THE RATING SHEET AND PLACE ICE CREAM IN 
FRONT OF HER] 
"Please taste and rate these three flavors of ice cream. 
Take as much as you need to be sure of your rating before 
going on to the next flavor. Please do not change a rating 
for any previous flavor after having tasted any subsequent 
flavor -- once you have tasted a new flavor you may not go 
back and change any ratings of another flavor. 
"Please rate the three flavors in the order in which they 
are laid out in front of you so that the tastes do not get 
mixed up. By the way, we will be throwing out any left-over 
ice cream, so after you finish all your ratings, feel free 
to go back and help yourself to as much of any flavor as you 
like. It is important, however, that you don't change any 
. * of your ratings." 
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Do you have any questions? 
[ANSWER QUESTIONS] 
I'll be back in about 10 minutes. 
[LEAVE ROOM. AFTER 10 MINUTES, RETURN, TAKE BOWLS AND 
RATING SHEET, GIVE QUESTIONNAIRE PACKET 2] 
Please fill out these questionnaires and let me know when 
you are finished. Please answer as honestly as possible. 
Remember, all responses are confidential. 
[STACKS BOWLS TOGETHER, INCLUDING THE LIDS, AND PLACE THEM 
IN THE GARBAGE CAN, SUCH THAT IT APPEARS THAT THEY ARE 
THROWN OUT BUT MAKE SURE THEY ARE EASILY RETRIEVED. DROP 
RATINGS SHEET IN DROP BOX. WAIT FOR SUBJECT TO COMPLETE 
QUESTIONNAIRE PACKET.] 
Thank you for participating in this experiment. This 
experiment was designed to test how personality factors and 
thinking on a specific, detailed level versus a general, 
self-reflective level interact to affect eating behavior. 
We will be calling you at the end of the semester with more 
information and will at that time be prepared to send you a 
letter describing the study in detail. You may contact the 
individual on this sheet if you have further questions 
before the end of the semester. 
[HAND SUBJECT THE CLOSING SHEET, SIGN NECESSARY PAPERWORK 
FOR CLASS CREDIT] 
Thank you. Have a good day. 
[USHER SUBJECT OUT. RECORD THE SUBJECT # ON QUESTIONNAIRE 
PACKET 2 AND DROP IT IN THE. "DROP BOX". RECORD THE SUBJECT 
NUMBER ON THE EXPERIMENTER RECORD, AS THIS WILL BE USED TO 
LOOK UP THE INITIAL WEIGHT OF THE ICE CREAM.] 
[IF YOU HAVE TIME AND HAVE ACCESS TO A SCALE (i.e, YOU ARE 
WORKING IN DEAN'S OFFICE), WEIGH BOWLS AND LIDS IMMEDIATELY 
FOLLOWING EACH SUBJECT SO THAT YOU CAN THROW THEM AWAY FOR 
GOOD.] 
[IF YOU DO NOT HAVE TIME BETWEEN SUBJECTS OR ARE NOT RUNNING 
SUBJECTS IN DEAN'S OFFICE, RETRIEVE THE BOWLS AND LIDS FROM 
THE GARBAGE AND HIDE THEM BEFORE RUNNING THE NEXT SUBJECT. 
BRING THEM TO DEAN'S OFFICE TO WEIGH THEM AT 4 PM, AFTER THE 
LAST SUBJECT IS RUN. ] 
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Debriefing Script 
Hello. My name is and I'm calling with regard 
to an experiment you participated in earlier in the 
semester. Do you remember the experiment in which you 
filled out a number of questionnaires and tasted three kinds 
of ice cream? 
[WAIT FOR A RESPONSE. IF SUBJECT DOES NOT REMEMBER THE 
EXPERIMENT, GIVE MORE DETAILS] 
After you finished that experiment we promised to call you 
with more details. That is what I'm doing now. Do you have 
a few minutes? 
[IF NO, ASK WHEN A BETTER TIME WOULD BE TO CALL AND THEN 
MAKE NOTE OF IT, THANK THE SUBJECT, AND PROMISE SOMEONE WILL 
CALL THEM LATER] 
First, we want to once again thank you for participating in 
the experiment. The experiment was designed to test how 
personality factors and thinking on a specific, detailed 
level versus a general, self-reflective level interact to 
affect eating behavior. 
We were interested in both your taste perception ratings and 
how much of the ice cream you ate. We believe that people 
with different personality features will rate the ice cream 
differently and will eat different amounts of ice cream 
after thinking on different levels. 
Unfortunately, to insure that the results would be unbiased, 
we could not tell you that the amount you ate was also of 
interest. Otherwise you might have been focusing on how 
much you ate and not on your ratings, and might not have 
eaten the same amount as you did naturally. 
Since other people will be taking this experiment, it is 
crucial that you do not talk to anyone about this experiment 
until the end of the year. In the same way that my telling 
you the true nature of this experiment might have biased our 
results, so might your telling them. In fact, this might 
even invalidate all the important information you gave us 
today. Do you understand? 
[PAUSE] 
At this time I would like to off er you a chance to have a 
more detailed, written description of the experiment and its 
goals. Would you like such a description? 
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[WAIT FOR RESPONSE.] 
[IF NO:] 
Well, at the end of the experiment we gave you the name of 
the experimenter in charge of the experiment. You may 
contact him if you want more information in the future. 
Would you like me to repeat the address? ["DEAN BEEBE, 
PSYCHOLOGY DEPARTMENT, LOYOLA UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, 6525 
NORTH SHERIDAN ROAD, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60626"] Thank you 
for your time. Good-bye. 
[IF YES:] 
Do you live on campus? 
[IF YES] Can we mail the written feedback to your 
campus address? 
[IF YES] What is that address? [TAKE ADDRESS] 
You will be receiving this written feedback in the 
near Future. 
[IF NO] I can arrange for you to pick to feedback 
up at a later date. You will be receiving a call 
in the near future to schedule a pick up time. 
Thank you for your time. Good-bye. 
[IF NO] Can we mail the written feedback to your home 
or off ice? 
[IF YES] What is that address? [TAKE ADDRESS] 
You will be receiving this written feedback in the 
near future. 
[IF NO] I can arrange for you to pick to feedback 
up at a later date. You will be receiving a call 
in the near future to schedule a pick up time. 
Thank you for your time. Good-bye. 
*This portion of the script is quoted from Polivy et al. 
(1988, p. 355). 
APPENDIX C 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
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I agree to take part in experiment #[31 or 14]. I realize 
that my participation in this particular experiment is 
voluntary and that I may withdraw from this experiment at 
any time for any reason without penalty. I also understand 
that data collected in this experiment are going to be used 
as a group, and that both my identity and my connection with 
any particular response will be kept strictly confidential. 
I understand that this experiment will involve the 
completion of several personality questionnaires as well as 
several taste-tests of ice cream. I certify that, to my 
knowledge, I have no allergy to ice cream or other dairy 
products. 
I understand that, upon completion of this experiment, I 
will receive one experimental credit to help either in 
completing a course requirement or course extra credit. I 
understand that if I have any questions in the future about 
this experiment, I may contact the person listed at the 
bottom of the page and will receive prompt feedback. 
Finally, I understand that a detailed explanation of the 
experiment will be offered to me both verbally and in 
writing at the end of the semester. I authorize the 
experimenter to contact me by telephone at that time. 
Subject Signature 
Date 
For further information contact: 
Dean Beebe 
Department of Psychology 
Loyola University of Chicago 
6525 North Sheridan Road 
Chicago, Illinois 60626 
APPENDIX D 
CLOSING SHEET 
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Thank you for participating in experiment #(31 or 14]. 
Your effort will make a definite contribution to this study 
and our knowledge of psychology. If you have any further 
questions about this experiment, or would like more detailed 
information about the theoretical background or hypotheses 
of the experiment, please contact: 
Dean Beebe 
Department of Psychology 
Loyola University of Chicago 
6525 North Sheridan Road 
Chicago, Illinois 60626 
APPENDIX E 
EXPERIMENTER RECORD 
Experimenter: 
Date: --------------
Subject #: 
----
Mass of bowls and lids of bowls: 
Before taste test: 
After taste test 
Total consumed 
Subject #: 
----
Mass of bowls and lids of bowls: 
Before taste test: 
After taste test 
Total consumed 
Subject #: 
----
Mass of bowls and lids of bowls: 
Before taste test: 
After taste test 
Total consumed 
NOTES 
NOTES 
NOTES 
SPECIAL NOTES (UNUSUAL SUBJECT BEHAVIOR, MECHANICAL 
DIFFICULTIES, INCONSISTENCIES IN PROCEDURE, ETC.): 
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